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This study investigates the development of the notion of man's will 
upon which Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche based their theories. Al-
though this topic had been virtually neglected in the great intellectual 
debates of the first to the eighteenth centuries, by the nineteenth cen-
tury the question of man 1 s vii 11--i ts origin, function, and va 1 ue--domi -
nated such philosophical discussions. An exploration of the differences 
in the perception and role of the will in the works of these three men 
is attempted, from Kant's redefinition of the nature of v1ill, to Schopcr1-
hauer1s redirection of its position in philosophical matters, to Nietz-
sche's radical reinterpretation of the entire problem. An examination 
of these profoundly different interpretations and implications reveals 
that Kant 1 s effort to emancipate the wi 11 from its causal connections to 
make room for moral responsibility \'Jas transformed by Nietzsche into an 
attempt to liberate mankind from his own moral and metaphysical misunder-
standings. 
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Prologue 
Curious as it may first appear, one of the v1tal intellectual 
issues of the past two centuries, the concept of man's will' had been 
virtually neglected in the great philosophical debates which had punc-
tuated enlightened discourse from the first to the eighteenth centu-
ries. During the nineteenth century, however, as a result of Kant's 
11 revolution 111 in philosophy, the question of man's will--its origin, 
function, and value--became of paramount importance in philosophical 
matters. Not only Kant, but also Schopenhauer and Nietzsche made the 
will basic to their own theories, albeit with profoundly different in-
terpretations and implications. This study will explore some of the 
differences in the perception and role of the will in the works of 
these three men. 
Since Kant (1724-1804) is the chronological, as well as the theo-
retical, precursor to both Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Nietzsche (1844-
1900), his views will be examined fir~t. But because Kant set the 
terms of this discussion by redefining the nature of will and its place 
in philosophical thought, it is necessary to survey some of the notions 
of will which were prevalent before him. There are problems inherent 
in this undertaking, the most annoying of which is the elusiveness of a 
definition of will itself. This is obviously crucial to any discussion 
of its "redefinition, 11 but proves to be exceedingly difficult to pin 
down, partly because thinkers--even one as meticulous as Kant--have not 
subscribed to any single definition of will. An attempt, however, must 
be made even at the risk of over-simplifying the issue. 
Throughout western thought, the will was often used as a blanket 
ii 
-tenn to include appetites, desires,·~r bodily needs. Althou~h there 
were numerous variations in such definitions over a period of many cen-
turies, they did have one element in co111110n: they did not refer to 
man's will as a separate faculty, i.e., a separate capability or power 
of one's mind, as reason, for example, often was. But the definition 
of will which is central to understanding the revolutionary focus of 
Kant's enterprise at the end of the eighteenth century is precisely 
that of will as an autonomous faculty, which he first employs in his 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781), and which is later seized upon with 
such profoundly perverse consequences by Schopenhauer qnd Nietzsche. 
In this first critique, Kant describes our will as that which spontane-
ously initiates a new series in time. This definition of will as a 
source of action is further broadened in Kant's subsequent Foundations 
of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and in the Critique of Practical 
Reason (1788) to include will as the basis of all our moral actions. 2 
This is a direction which is novel and quite different from all prior 
definitions of will; however, it is a path followed by neither Schopen-
ha~er nor Nietzsche. 
That this notion of will as a separate faculty would have seemed 
strange to earlier philosophers is evident from a brief review of the 
definitions which predominated during the Classical, Hellenistic, and 
Christian eras. As Hannah Arendt notes in The Life of the Mind: Wil-
ling, 11 the faculty of the Will was unknown to Greek antiquity ... 113 
What she means by this is that the concept of wi 11 as a component of 
the mind, capable of initiating something altogether new in time, was 
iii 
.not one which was discussed by the greatest of these thinkers. 4 She 
observes, in fact, that the tenn "free will , 11 which presupposes the 
view that one might choose not to follow a particular course of action, 
is notably lacking in the language of Classical Greece. 5 She finds, 
too, that this "neglect" of will as a faculty capable of acting contin-
gently, which is common to most of the pre-Socratic philosophers, is in 
accordance with the temporal concepts of antiquity. These stressed the 
cyclical nature of life, in which nothing totally new ever occurred. 
Even Aristotle, whose views differed in many ways from these, 
still did not have a concept of the will. Although he did develop the 
related notion of 11 proairesis 11 ( 11 before makin9 a choicel!), whereby one 
chooses between alternate objects or ways of conduct, Arendt contends 
that this is merely "liberum arbitrium 11 ("free choice"), in which the 
goals of such choices are already given. Thus, while one may choose a 
certain means to an end--one may refrain from drinking in excess--one 
chooses this path because one knows that good health (the "given" goal) 
demands this abstinence. Since the ends are already determined, this 
faculty of choice is neither spontaneous, autonomous, nor the beginning 
of something entirely new, but is only the arbiter between reason and 
desires, neither of which will ever lead to action of its own accord. 6 
After the first century A.D., with the growth of Christian doctrine 
of time to rival the cyclical and deterministic classical ones, a shift 
occurred in the definition of will which was to become crucial to Kant's 
enterprise. This shift had to do both with a changed view of temporal-
ity, and a new focus on will as something which functions within the 
iv 
.mind as a whole in conjunction with reason/desire/intellect. 
The Christians developed, first of all, a concept of rectilinear 
time, which brought with it the idea of something new oriqinating in 
time. This new beginning was Christ, who had come once to sa1ve man 
from his own sins. When Christ comes the second time, it will not be 
as part of an unending cycle of recurrent events, but as herald to the 
end of the world. Moreover, their idea of immortality, of future heav-
enly rewards or hellish punishments, as the Apostle Paul noted, was 
meaningless in a world governed by the laws of casuality. If all events 
were determined by antecedent events in time, then one could be neither 
commended nor. reprimanded for his acti ans, and the ethi ca 1 demands for 
Christians to lead a morally good life were empty. For only if the acts 
so judged were 11 free 11 --i.e., under the control of the aqent who could 
choose to do or not to do them--would moral judgments of approbation and 
disapprobation become meaningful. Paul resolved, therefore, that we are 
11 free 11 to do right or wrong, but our salvation ·is not determined by our 
will, but by God's mercy. 
Paul's dilemma was this: How could one resolve the conflicting 
claims between God's power, which was omnipotent, and His judgment, 
which was equitable? If God is all-powerful, then He certainly has the 
power to make us act any way He wants us to. If that is the case, how-
ever, then God can not judge our actions at all, for to do so would be 
to judge Himself. God has, therefore, chosen to limit His own power to 
give us the freedom to believe in Him or not, and to act accordingly. 
Since there is no chain of events that automatically leads us to faith, 
v 
·we have "free will," at r.east to the extent of choosing to believe in 
God or not. Through the power of God's mercy; He judges us not on the 
basis of our acts alone, but also on the strength of our faith in Him. 
Yet even Paul's c0111T1itment to "free will" (about which more will 
be said later) does not postulate an autonomous faculty. Paul proclaimed 
the will to be ultimately impotent because it automatically splits, pro-
ducing its own counter-wi 11 (the 11 I wi 11 11 and the 11 I will -not 11 ), which 
binders the will from ever successfully making a difference either in 
this world, or the next. We can neither will nor strive for our own 
salvation because such matters are governed solely by God's mercy, which 
is in turn based upon God's will, not man's. Thus, our future salvation 
is out of our control: it is precisely this element of control--of pow-
er to affect our own future--that truly distinguishes the Kantian con-
cept of will from its predecessors. 
The Stoic version of the will, which was flourishing contemporane-
ously with Pauline Christianity, was similarly impotent. It also was 
unable to actively alter one's present or future condition. Although 
Epictetus declared the will to be omnipotent, closer examination reveals 
that this was a curiously powerless form of power. Indeed, the will 's 
first decision was to know 11 'the 1 imi ts of the wi 11 to get and the wi 11 
to avoid ... and to dismiss those things that are beyond us . , .. 7 
This leaves only the realm of interior psychological adjustment to ex-
ternal conditions in our control. In other words, it is one's internal, 
emotional response to events which is the crucial factor here, for Epic-
tetus firmly believed that it was not pain or death which made us miser-
vi 
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'able, but the fear of pain or death; therefore, in order to lead a se-
rene, tranquil life, we need only to fear fearfulness itself. Once we 
have learned to be 11 apathetic 11 --unaffected by either life or death--and 
to will ourselves to acceptance of our particular situation with tran-
quility, we will have achieved a life undisturbed by stonns or obsta-
cles. 
Epictetus further advised those who wished to live well to 
11 
• • 
1 let your wi 11 be that events should happen as they do. 1 118 Not 
only is this a singularly unaggressive fonn of power, but it rests on 
the Stoic notion of 11 heimarmene, 11 the 11 doctrine of fate which holds that 
everything happens in hannony with the nature of the universe and that 
every particular thing, man or animal, plant or stone, has its task al-
loted to it by the whole and is justified by it. 119 It is against just 
such notions of universal hannony and detenninism, as well as individual 
impotence, that the Kantian conception of will stands in opposition. 
If, according to Webster in 1975, the will means 11 to control by the pow-
er of the will ... 1110 , then we have come a long way from the Stoics. 11 
The focus has shifted from the will as something which needs to be con-
trol led (in the form of appetites, desires, or fears), to something 
which actively does the controlling, and is no longer subject to divine 
mercy or the hannony of nature. 
Despite their numerous differences, all of these theories are at 
least in agreement on one very substantial notion: they all assume that 
the will is real. But in the seventeenth century, in the wake of the 
decline of Christian theological domination, there were some philoso-
vii 
·phers who challenged even this fundamental assumption. Hobbes and Spin-
oza, for example, suggested that the will was not real, but an illusion. 
Central to this contention was their association of will with freedom, 
which Paul had made long before, and which plagued philosophers as di-
verse in attitude as Augustine, Kant, and Schopenhauer. As Spinoza ex-
plained, if one assumed that a stone could be sensible of its own mo-
tion, then any stone set in motion by an outside force "'would believe 
itself to be completely free and would think that it continued in mo-
tion solely because of its own wish. 11112 We are similarly deluded into 
believing ourselves to be free "'simply because [we] are conscious of 
[our] actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are 
detenni ned. ' 1113 Thus, by the end of the seventeenth centur~, the wi 11 
was often admitted to be a "subjectively felt faculty," perhaps inherent 
in the very structure of our consciousness, but nevertheless, it was 
not a "real" faculty. So when Kant turned to his task at the close of 
the eighteenth century, he had inherited notions of the will that con-
finned either its impotence or its illusory nature. Aqainst these posi-
tions, Kant's postulation of the will as the foundation of his philo-
sophical system stands in stark contrast. 
viii 
Kant 
Central to Kant's theory of the will is its association with reason. 
We must, therefore, look briefly at Kant's. conception of the role of 
reason in our functioning. Although there is only one reason, Kant 
claims that it has two distinguishable functions. In the Critique of 
Pure Reason, Kant focusses on the use of 11 theoretical 11 reason, which 
deals with man's cognitive faculty. "Pure reason" is the means by 
which we investigate our capacity for knowing things a priori through 
understanding. The central issue of this critique is to ascertain how 
"synthetic a priori" judgments are possible. Before Kant, only analytic 
statements such as: 11 2 + 2 = 411 ; or, "this chair is a piece of furni-
ture,11 were considered to give a oriori knowledge, because they alone 
contained their predicate within the concept of their subject. But as 
Kant discovered in his first 11 revolutionary 11 insight, even the laws of 
mathematics, the supposedly pure "analytic a priori" universally--true 
statements, were actually synthetic--that is, they went beyond their 
subject matter, and yet they were still a priori because they did not 
need any particular experience to amplify their concepts. 
In his second critique, the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), 
Kant's objective is to prove that theoretical (pure) reason can have 
practical applications in the realm of moral decisions, i.e., it can 
and does affect the ways we act. This. is of paramount importance if 
Kant is to succeed in his task of uniting the previously incompatible 
realms of objective and subjective knowledge. In this work Kant con-
tends that an ethical system can be developed wholly a priori and can 
be applied to man, because reason, which provides only the universal 
1 
fonn, is not dependent upon the specific data of the particular situa-
tion. Although this may sound impossible at first, it is always neces-
sary to keep in mind that Kant had shown in the first critique that, 
cont~ary to traditional theories, knowledge was not just passive con-
2 
fonn1tY to an object. Instead, he had explained the phenomenal charac-
teristifs of objects in tenns of the behavior of the knowing mind, whose 
structure makes it imperative that we use such orderin9 principles as 
space and time to aid our understanding. He had thus developed the no-
tion of an active reason that was not condemned to purely passive con-
templation, but one that actually helped to fonn the world which it 
examined. What this means is that we have "a priori" knowled~e of~ 
those aspects of objects which we ourselves have imposed on them. 
What of the "reality" of those objects per se? In his Foundations 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant makes a distinction between two 
realms of reality, the noumenal and the phenomenal. One of these realms 
is composed of "things in appearance" which are subject to the causal 
laws of nature. These are the facts (or objects) of everyday life, 
which are known to us throught the world of sensory experience. These 
are externally determined by their causal relationships to each other, 
and are referred to as "phenomena." The other realm, which we can nev-
er 11 know 11 (because all the objects of our knowledge pertain to the sen-
sory realm), but can only assume "behind the appearances," is that of 
the "noumena. 11 These are the "things in themselves," the essences which 
are not detennined by external contingencies, but instead establish 
their own laws. They are, therefore, free. 
It is in this context that -Kant develops his notion of the auton-
3 
·omous or "free" wi 11. The will, according to Kant, is the capacity of a 
rational being for acting in accordance with the conception of laws. By 
this definition, Kant can show that pure reason can be practical in re-
gard to the will, and that the will, in re9ard to morality, can be free. 
He attempts to validate our basic belief in our own freedom by disclos-
ing that the phenomenal world, which is determined by the causal laws of 
nature, is only one aspect of the "real world" we can perceive. For 
there is another aspect to this world--that of the noumenal reality--
which lies beyond the realm of appearances, and in which laws themselves 
are formulated. Since we are not solely a part of the natural world 
(determined by external laws), but participants who use our reason to 
intuit realms beyond any possible experience, and thereby attempt to un-
derstand the universal forms of laws, we are also part of the noumenal 
world (where such laws are made). Kant suggests that since "Neither ob-
ligation nor law can be derived from experience, for experience estab-
lishes no necessity ... 1114 , and since we, as thinkinq bein(ls can imaa-
ine such object--less concepts as obligations and laws, they must be 
part of the noumenal reality--i.e., they exist outside of time or space, 
and are not constrained by the natural laws of causality. Further evi-
dence for this dual character of reality is our possession of a priori 
knowledge, which puts us outside of the temporal order when it comes to 
knowing~ 
While this may seem implausible at first, Kant explains that "there 
is not the least contradiction between a thing in appearance (as belong-
ing to the world of sense) being subject to certain laws of which it is 
independent as a thing or being in itself. 1115 But the only point of me-
diation between these 2 realms is that offered by the free will, a con-
4 
.cept which is not, in itself empirically knowable. Kant tries to define 
this interaction in the fo 11 owing way: 11 As wi 11 is a kind of causality 
of living beings so far as they are rational, freedom would be that 
property of this causality by which it can be effected independently of 
foreign causes detennining it ... 1115 Kant seems to be saying that 
freedom is here defined as the power to be a 11 cause 11 without being an 
"effect" of some previous cause, i.e., the power to initiate a new se-
ries of causal relationships, which necessarily implies a position out-
side of time, for otherwise it would become part of an infinite reqress 
in these relationships. A few pages further, however, Kant admits that, 
"The subjective impossibility of explaining freedom of the will is the 
same as the impossibility of discovering and explaining an interest 
which man can take in moral laws. 1117 
Yet we do take such an interest, even if we cannot logically ex-
plain our reasons for it. Kant shows that we all have such interests; 
and furthennore, that we also have ordinary-moral conv-ictions of duty-
and obligation, which comprise our "moral a priori . 11 In fact, our "ob-
ligatoriness constitutes the essence of morality; 1118 and even if we can-
not understand how a being in the world of appearances, such as we, can 
ever impinge upon, much less formulate a law for, something in the world 
of essences, we can still entertain the possibility of such an occur-
rence. 
In what at first appears to be a surprising move, Kant broadens 
his concept of freedom of the will to include the ability to make laws, 
as well as to initiate a new series of causal events, which, of course, 
would not have occurred if the will had been different. Kant now estab-
5 
lishes this legislative function of the will, and then equates his 
"free will" with a will under "moral law. 11 Although this sounds contra-
dictory, it is so only when one defines freedom in the negative sense, 
i.e., as "freedom from" something else. But this type of freedom is on-
ly of "limited liability, 11 because it does not free man from the natural 
world, with its web of causal relationships. It is merely freedom in a 
11 legal 11 sense. Only the rational will, which operates in the noumenal 
realm, can free us in the positive sense, since it alone is capable of 
providing a basis "for determination independent of the world of sense. 
It thus is seen as "freedom to 11 do something. But what is this some-
thing? 
Kant argues that the will and its actions, whatever they may be, 
are actually free only when they have been "determined by the totality 
of ends and requirements of their unity. 1119 That is, only the well-be-
ing of mankind as a whole can serve as the determinant of the rational 
will. It is not enough for us to will our own happiness as the 9uide to 
our moral behavior. For, although the desire for happiness may be uni-
versal, happiness itself is individual, and a world filled with individ-
uals all striving for their own personal pleasures is a world of chaos 
and conflict. If we could, however, decide that: "I will act so that 
I can enjoy my life in my own way, 1120 all of our subsequent actions 
would be themselves determined by our own individual concept of "enjoy" 
at any particular moment. We would never be "free", even though we each 
had "freely chosen" to satisfy our own desires, because these desires 
would themselves imprison us within our own particularity. 
This is why Kant insists that the wi 11 and its actions are 11 unfree 11 
6 
.when they have been determined by some individual object of desire, 
such as one's own particular happiness or well-being. For us to be 
freely willing moral agents, we must, therefore, act according to a ra-
tional principle, i.e., the moral law, and not from any inclination to 
an object in the sensuous realm. Kant repeatedly insists that for an 
action to be "morally good 11 , it is not sufficient for it to conform to a 
moral law; rather, it must be done for the sake of that law. 21 The rea-
son for this is that anytime there is a specific content given to a law, 
it is necessarily limited in its application and its validity. So, if 
we merely "conform" to a moral law, we are not, by Kant's definition, 
following the formal, universal law legislated by reason, for Kant's law 
is based upon no particular content; therefore, it would be impossible 
to "conform" to it. As Kant explains, "Th~ sole principle of morality 
consists in independence from all material of the law (i.e., a desired 
object) and in the accompanying of choice by the mere universal legis-
lating fonn which a maxim must be capable of·-hav-ing. That independence, 
however, is freedom in the negative sense, while this intrinsic legis-
lation of pure and thus practical reason is freedom in the positive 
sense. Therefore, the moral law expresses nothing else than the autono-
my of the pure practical reason, i.e., freedom. 1122 
It appears as though Kant has introduced yet another dualism here; 
now freedom itself has 2 different aspects, as do reason and reality. 
There is "negative freedom," which looses us from the laws of nature 
(from necessity), and there is also "positive freedom," whereby someone 
willing gives himself a law, and then sul:xnits to its jurisdiction, ra-
ther than sul:xnitting to an alien one. This positive freedom is actually 
7 
the source of the law that the free will follows when initiating a new 
. f t . t. 23 s . . t . th . 1 t f 1 f 1 . 1 series o even s in ime. ince l 1s is mora ac o se - eq1s a-
tion (submitting to one's own law) which liberates us from the deter-
mination of causal relationships, freedom is now seen clearly as resid-
ing in the individual subject--not in the objective world of sensory 
experiences. 
But this connection between law and free will also serves as a 
bridge between the two aspects of the world. For the laws of causality do 
operate in our everyday phenomenal realm; therefore, it follows that our 
free will itself can not be lawless, but must operate accordinq to laws 
of a 11 peculiar kind, 1124 one of which is self-legislation. Kant believes 
that nothing less than the dignity of humanity itself, its intrinsic 
worth, is based upon this capacity to formulate universal normative laws 
to which it is also subject. 
Moral value, and our primary responsibility, are thus found to lie 
within 11 the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends which can be 
realized by such action. For the will stands, as it were, at the cross-
roads half-way between its a priori principle which is formal and its a 
. . . . h" h . . l 1125 poster1or1 lncent1ve w ic 1s mater1a . The moral will, therefore, 
signifies a relationship between our a priori reason and our a posteri-
_.£!:_i (known through experience) desires. For these are two distinguishable 
aspects of all acts of will: a want for something in the sensuous 
world, which is a dynamic incentive to our impulses; and a recoqnition 
of duty, which is a cognitive realization of what we l!ought 11 to do. It 
is this distinction that separates acts of will from those of mere de-
sire, in which the:bbjects are the sole·goals:of-~ur behavior. _But 
8 
.Kant maintains that acts of will are further guided by knowledge of the 
principle which relates such actions objectively. The fundamental dif-
ference that this makes is seen in the fact that althou~h all animals 
have desire, only rational men possess will. 26 It is solely throuah our 
reason that we become aware of ourselves, and consequently aware of the 
conflicting claims between our duty and our desires. As noted earlier, 
Kant claims that nature itself presents us with neither a sense of obli-
gation or of duty, and it is only by using our powers of self-reflection 
that we are able to separate ourselves from the realm of nature, and 
participate in the noumenal realm by consciously and freely willing to 
do either "good" or "evil." 
Man's only guides to such actions are found in Kant's notion of 
"imperatives," which are commands of reason that function as constraints 
upon a will which is not totally aood, i.e., upon a human will. 27 There 
are two :krnds at imperatives, hypottt~ticai and cate~fo-rica1. ·l-1yperttiet·ica1 
imperatives are those in which the action is good only as a means to 
something else; but a categorical imperative is one in which the action 
is good in and of itself--as an end, not as a means. There is, however, 
only one categorical imperative. It is: "Act only accordinq to that 
maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law. 1128 For it is through the necessity of an action per-
formed from respect for this law that duty, which is the "condition" of 
a will which is good in itself, arises. Only those actions which are 
performed according to duty, not desire, have moral worth. Furthennore, 
this worth is determined by the universal form of the moral law, not by 
its particular content. 
9 
Yet it is just this emphasis on the fonn of the categorical impera-
tive, rather than its content or context, which has led to numerous 
criticisms from other philosophers who either failed to grasp, or to 
agree with, Kant's attempt to find a via media between the chaotic an-
archy of a free will subject to no laws, and the oppressive tyranny of 
one subject to laws imposed from without. Kant claims that the "free 
will must find its ground of determination in law, but independently of 
the material of the law. 1129 His categorical imperative achieves this 
precisely because it does not attain its validity through any "utilitar-
ian accomplishment of predetermined ends", (in which case it would be 
merely a 11 means 11 ); but rather, through the form of its universal legis-
lation, it proves itself to be an end. Since this moral imperative is a 
law formulated by reason, and not by experience gained throu~h the sens-
es, it is 11 forma1 11 ; therefore, it is not determined by any of the causa 1 
laws of nature pertaining to the phenomenal realm. In other words, it 
is based on autonomy--or free will--and thus is not limited in its val-
idity or applicability to any particular content or context. 3° Further-
more, this form is not, as some detractors have suggested, empty of con-
tent, but by its very 11 universalizability11 it prescribes a criterion by 
which any law can be evaluated. 
Although this may sound as if it is contradictory, or at best con-
fusing, it is consistent with Kant's other attempts to rP.solve such 
seemingly contradictory concepts as t~i ngs-:;.~n~Pappearaoce, and' ,thtn~s-­
i n--themse l ves, or free will and detenninism. To Kant, such contradic-
tions are apparent rather than real, and are the result of our applica-
tion of the rules of one realm to the objects in another. As Kant had 
10 
warned, 11 Freedom ... among all the ideas of speculative reason is the 
only one whose possibility we know a priori. We do not understand it, 
but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we do know. 1131 
But if freedom can never be understood completely, because it is the ob-
ject of something in the noumenal realm (i.e., moral will), not of some-
thing in the phenomenal realm (which human understanding determines), it 
can sti 11 be thought of as a possi bi 1 ity; and the fact that vie fa i 1 to 
understand it does not in any way negate or limit its reality. 
vJith his observation that 11 obedience to the law that one has him-
self prescribed is the only real freedom 1132 , because it is the only time 
that our actions are not determined by causal events in the phenomenal 
world, Kant feels he has discovered an essential connection between the 
apparently contradictory concepts of laws and freedom. He thus can offer 
a way to transcend the paradox of our position as self-conscious bein~s 
who are phenomenally determined in the world of appearances, but noumen-
ally free in the world of essences, and this is but another of his 11 rev-
olutionary11 theories. In the final analysis, it would appear as if 
Kant had successfully accomplished his primary objectives. With his 
fundamental identification of practical reason with will, Kant was able 
to re's cue our concept of free 1-1Ji 11 from the causal determinism sugaested 
by 18th century scientific and philosophic thought, and thereby to offer 
a way out of the apparent dualisms within his own system. In this way, 
Kant made good on his 11 revolutionary11 attempt to liberate thought, 
through a self-critique of the limits of reason, from the traditional 
stalemate between the dogmatic claims of the rationalists and the skep-
tical attacks of the empiricists. 
11 
It s hou 1 d be apparent by now that Kant 1 s concept of a free \.'!ill is 
incredibly more complex than just a 11 source of action. 11 It is also the 
source for all moral decisions and actions, the bridge between the nou-
menal and phenomenal realms, and the legislatina agent which is both au-
thor of, and obedient to, its own laws. It is undeniably real, and the 
locus of power is firmly established in the individual--but this power 
is expressed only through the ethical demands of reason in the forfTl of 
the categorical imperative. 
The question arises, how such a previously neglected notion as the 
autonomous faculty of will could have developed into the foundation for 
a sophisticated philosophical system such as Kant's? How was it pos-
sible for the concept of will to rid itself of its illusory or subordi-
nated position, which it had acquired by the end of the seventeenth 
century, and to become the focal point of philosophy--all within a span 
of approximately one hundred years? 33 It seems reasonable to suaqest that 
two developments within this period were crucial. First, 11 man 11 became 
the object of both scientific and philosophic investigations, a process 
encouraged by the factual advancement of scientific revolution and the 
theoretical insights of such early Enlightenment thinkers as Descartes, 
Locke, and Vico. By 1785, when Kant's Foundations of the t1etaphysics of 
Morals was published, the successful conclusion of the American Revolu-
tion proved that men and women could alter not only their own present, 
but their future as well.34 In such an intellectual climate, Kant's post-
ulation of the will as the basis of both freedom and morality was not as 
unthinkable as it might have been even a few decades before. 
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Kant's 11 revolutionary 11 focus on the \.'Jill as a basic component of his 
philosophical system stimulated further investigations and interpreta-
tions of the will throughout the lgthcentury, several of which finally de-
parted in important respects from Kant's metaphysical conceptton of the 
\-Jill and his belief in its central moral function. 'One of the earliest of 
these is Schopenhauer's multivolume \tJOrk, The \•Jorld as Hill and Idea 
(1818). As this title suggests, Schopenhauer also places the will at 
the center of his philosophical theories. But it is with a decided dif-
ference: for Schopenhauer not only distinguishes the will from anv rea-
son whatsoever, whether it be 11 pure 11 or 11 practical 11 , but also asserts 
the essentially amoral nature of the will itself. Kant's view thus an-
pears to have spawned its own antithesis in Schopenhauer. 
Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's views are based upon the Kantian phi-
losophy. He repeatedly refers to himself as 11 Kant 1 s true successor". 
Schopenhauer explains how he could owe so much to Kant, and yet deviate 
so far from his views on the most crucial matters, in a lenathy critique 
in The World as Will and Idea. Here he credits Kant with perceivinn 
the fundamental distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, 
but then chides him for not attaining 11 to the knowledge that phenomena 
is the \tJOrld as idea, and the thing in itself is the will. 1135 Schopen-
hauer thus accepts Kant's dualistic vision of reality, and believes that 
he has actually perfected the Kantian system by discovering the true na-
ture of the noumenal realm. Although Kant had claimed that this knowl-
edge was forever barred from man's understanding, Schopenhauer disaarees. 
As Schopenhauer explains, Kant had seen that all natural laws, as 
well as the world itself, were conditioned by ~1e fonn of the subject's 
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·knowledge. That is, our knowledge of our world is always determined by 
the a priori forms (such as, space and time) which we have imposed on 
our experience, or in Schopenhauer's paraphrase of this Kantian insiqht, 
"the world is my idea 1136; however. thiS vi.ston of the world as 1tdea_ is 
merely its phenomenal appearance, not its noumenal essence. To discover 
this noumenal reality, Kant had used his reflective knowledge to posit 
the "other side of appearances". But this assumption of the noumenal 
was itself based upon an inference from the law of causality, which held 
that our.sensations must have an external cause. Since the notions of 
causality, space, and time--the forms of the visible world which condi-
tion our very perception of it by our senses--are known-'-to: ·us. a ptior.i 
through intuition, it follows that such purely intuitive perceptions 
underlie our empirical perceptions. 
Yet this is precisely the point at which Kant became "confused". 
For if these concepts are all known to us a priori, Schopenhauer claims, 
they are, consequently, functions of our intellect; therefore, they are 
of subjective origin, and sensation itself is purely subjective. Kant's 
"mistake" is that he failed to distinguish properly between perceptible 
knowledge (what we know by intuition or sensation) and abstract knowl-
edge (what we know by r.eason or reflection). 37 This failure led to 
Kant's "inextricable confusion" of intuitive and abstract knowledqe, in 
which Kant further confused the idea of perception with that of abstract 
ideas and called it "experience. 1138 Schopenhauer cites several examples · 
of this confusion in Kant's works: for example, in his Prolegomena to 
any Future Metaphysics (sections 20-22), Kant claimed that perception 
and sensation belong only to our sensory experience, while judoment 
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(thinking) belonged solely to our understandin9. But if we apply the 
law of causality entirely a priori (prior to our experience of chanqes 
experienced by our senses), this "law" is of as subjective an orioin as 
our sensations are; therefore, it can not lead to any noumenal knowl-
edge.39 
Schopenhauer rescues Kant's "true and imoortant insight" as to the 
a priori nature of the causal 1 aw from Kant 1 s "fa 11 aci ous proofs" by 
claiming that "empirical perception is and remains merely our idea; it 
is the world as idea.'AO From this realization, Schopenhauer argues 
that there is no real difference between experience and its object; 
therefore, the reality j2_ the representation, and more specifically, the 
world is my representation. Only through our o\'m self-conscious aware-
ness, which "proclaims the will as the inner nature of our own rhenome-
na11, 41 can we realize that the will is also the 11 inner essence" of the 
world itself. Schopenhauer contends that such intuitive insiohts into 
our own nature provide parallel insights into the nature of reality pe_!:_ 
se and allow us to perceive that the core of mankind and the core of 
the world is will .42 
But what is this generalized concept of the will, which is the met-
aphysical basis of all phenomena? Here again, Schopenhauer distances 
himself from Kant by defining the will as the ultimate principle of 
being--as "one almighty, indestructible, eternal 1143 strivino for ''some-
thing''. The will is the causeless craving which only expresses the will 
to live--to continue existing--but which has no specific qoal. It is 
unrest, demand, an insatiable desire for existence that wells up as soon 
as it has been satisfied: it is the true expression of the world's (and 
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our) innermost being. Yet because this will is the noumenal reality, it 
exists outside of space and time, and only becomes the 11 world 11 as it be-
comes objectified.:!_!! space and time accordinq to the principle of indi-
viduation. In other \'/Ords, as it becomes divided aaainst itself, 
against its essential one-ness, and becomes objectified as 11 ! 11 and 
11 they, 11 (as the world and its multiplicity of beinas), it beqins to 
strive against itself. This is a direct result of the fact that each 
particular individual now strives for himself. 
This will is not only egoistic, but--a radical departure from Kant--
is opposed to the welfare of anyone other than ourselves, and is, there-
fore, heedless of moral considerations altooether. 44 Furthermore, we 
ourselves, as manifestations of this will, are imbued with an overpower-
ing a priori desire for life: 11 We ourselves are the \vill to live, and 
therefore we must live, well or ill .'r45 Hence, our primary focus and 
only direction, which is given to us a priori and grounded in noumenal 
reality, is to exist, to continue beinq, and moral laws or cateoorical 
imperatives have no foundation in such a primeval force as Schopenhauer's 
wi 11 . 
Even the world itself, as it manifests this all-encompassing, 
blindly demanding will, seems far removed from the Kantian realm, VJhere 
order, reason, and morality prevail. Instead, Schopenhauer's \'torld is 
one in which chaos reigns over meaningless struqale and strife, and our 
only source of satisfaction and stabi l i ty--our self-conscious a1<Jareness 
of ourselves as individual beings--is itself an illusion. For as, 
Schopenhauer notes, "at bottom, it is the \'Jill that is spoken of \·!hen·· 
ever 1 11 appears in a judgment. 1146 Since there is no ultimate distinc-
tion between 11 my 11 \'fill and 11 your 11 will, (both are merely manifestations 
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of the primordial will), the world is nothing more than the site of dis-
tressing conflict and deception, and the 11 I" of my a\A.Jareness is no more 
than the "mouthpiece" of the will to live, which "gnaws at itself for-
ever. 1A7 
As dismally depressing as this seems, the fact that I do have self-
consci ous awareness provides my only pathv1ay of escape from the misery 
and insatiable wants of this world. Although the vJill, "as noumena, 
constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man; in it-
self, however, it is unconscious. For consciousness is conditioned by 
the intellect, and the intellect is a mere accident of our beinq ... 1A8 
It is only the knovJing intellect, which is itself 11 passive" and a 11 ser-
vant of the will, 1A9 v1hich can become aware of the nature of the vmrld 
as will, and can penetrate the illusions of individuation to perceive 
the noumena 1 rea 1 i ty of the vii ll . Or, as Schopenhauer puts it, 11 The 
will is the substance of man, the intellect the accident; the will is 
the matter, the intellect is the form; the \'Jill is the warmth, the in-
tellect is the light. 1150 In direct opposition to the traditional theo-
ries, Schopenhauer cites further evidence of the will 1 s power over the 
intellect: "The intellect is really like the reflective surface of the 
water, but the water itself is like the will, whose disturbance, there-
fore, at once destroys the clearness of that mirror and the distinctness 
of its images. 1151 And, while the intellect may become tired, because 
knowing is always accompanied by effort, the will is never tired, be-
cause willing is our very nature, and thus requires neither effort nor 
practice. 52 The will 1 s dominance requires that, at times, the 11 intel-
lect must do violence to its own nature, which aims at the truth, for it 
compels its self , contrary to its ovm laws, to regard as true thin9s 
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which are neither true nor probable, ... in order to appease ... for 
a while the restlessness and unmanageability of the will. 1153 
After thus "proving" the ultimate impotence of the intellect in re-
lation to the will, Schopenhauer surprisinqly asserts that this very 
same intellect may function "free" from the wil 1. It does this through 
self-awareness, by which "knowledge breaks free from the service of the 
will, by subjectively ceasing to be merely individual, and thus becom-
ing the pure \\Ii 11-1 ess subject of knowledge ... 1154 Once the intellect 
has, through contemplation, perceived the one-ness of the will behind 
the veil of multiplicity, it can quiet and st1fle the will--temporarily. 
In fact, this "whole knm\lledge of the nature of the world, the mirror of 
the will, which has grown up through the comprehension of Ideas, becomes 
a quieter of the will; and thus free, the will suppresses itself. 1155 
This contemplation is facilitated by both aesthetic and philosophic 
speculations, but is itself always subject to the tension between the 
temporary supremacy of our intellect, and the eternal supremacy of the 
· 11 56 Wl • 
Although it is not altogether clear how the intellect can ever aain 
supremacy over the will, one can infer, from Schopenhauer's contention 
that the 1tlill, when "freed" by intellectual contemplation, "suppresses 
itself", that his theory allows for some form of freedom for the will. 
But this he specifically does not do when speakinq of the will in the 
phenomenal realm--which is the only realm in which we can sensibly speak 
of having "free \'Jill 11 •57 schopenhauer agrees with Kant that while freedom 
is commonly defined in a negative way, as the absence of restraints, 
when freedom manifests power, it becomes positive. Schopenhauer differ-
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entiates among three different types of freedom--physical, intellectual, 
and moral. Physical freedom is expressed by the notion that everythin!l 
moves or acts only as a result of its own will; intellectual freedom 
presupposes that we have voluntary control over our own thoughts; and 
the concept of moral freedom assumes that 11 I am free when I can do what 
I will . 11 Although these distinctions are not quite clear, Schopenhauer 
focusses on the last assumption. He discovers that the notion of moral 
freedom raises the question whether I am free to will my ovm volitions. 
This is the crucial issue to Schopenhauer, who sees the real question 
here to be: "does the will retain the freedom to will or not to will? 1158 
Essential to this question is the distinction between wishino and 
v1illing. Schopenhauer explains that one 11 can wish two opposin0 actions, 
but will only one of them. Only the act reveals to his self-conscious-
ness which of the two he wills. 1159 What is truly at issue here is the 
grounds of each act of willing. If, as Schopenhauer contends, man's 
v1ill .:12_ his authentic self, the true "core of his being", then it con-
stitutes the ground of his being, and is something beyond v1hi ch he can-
not go. In other words, man "is as he wills, and wills as he is . 
Therefore, to ask him whether he could also will differently than he 
does is to ask whether he could also be other than himself; and that he 
does not know. 1160 Although Schopenhauer agrees with the subjectively-
felt fact that we all self-consciously believe that we can do what we 
will, he further explains: "'You can do what you will, but in any oiven 
moment of your life you can will only one definite thing, and absolutely 
nothing other than that one thing. 11161 We thus have only a 11 relative 
and comparative freedom" which is dependent upon our capability of 
thought. This gives us a greater number of choices than animals 
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.have, because we are free of the immediate compulsion of perception that 
forces them to act, but is not what we usually mean by "freedom", i.e., 
acting without restraints. We are, however, always subject to our "nat-
ural delusion" that posits our firmly held, self-conscious conviction 
that we have freedom over our own will. In a passaqe that is reminis-
cent of Spinoza's parable of the stone's certainty of its own freedom of 
motion, Schopenhauer describes the water's similar conviction: 
'I can make high waves (yes! in the sea durinq a storm); I 
can rush down hill (yes! in the river bed); I can plunge down 
foaming and gushing (yes! in the waterfall); I can rise free-
ly as a stream of water into the air {yes! in the fountain), 
... but I am doing none of these things now, and am volun-
tarily6~emaining quiet and clear water in the reflectin9 
pond.' 
Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's belief in the illusory asoect of the 
11 fr'eedom 11 .of ::-.our\ wi 11 : is ,·fundamentally'. opposed .to:· Spinoza ~'s :view. -·For 
Schopenhauer never doubts the reality of the will itself, which is Spin-
oza's contention, but only the illusion as to its freedom in the pheno-
menal realm. Schopenhauer attempts to explain away this confusinq as-
pect of the will by positing the origin of our belief in our own free 
will as the result of our perception of the noumenal reality of the will 
itself. The will "reveals itself to every one directly as the in-itself 
of his own phenomenal being. And it is also this immediate knowledge of 
one's own will out of which in human consciousness the concept of 
freedom springs; for certainly the will as world-creating, as noumena, 
is free from the principle of sufficient reason and therewith from all 
necessity, thus is completely independent, free, and indeed almiqhty 11 • 63 
Although our own will, as it participates in this phenomenal world, 
is subject to the causal laws of nature, (from which Kant had liberated 
it), it is "free" only so far as it manifests the noumenal will--the 
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driving force of our being--behind it. But we have no power or control 
over this will in the long run, only the temporary respite from its e-
ternal striving which is offered by intellectual contemplation of artis-
tic works or philosophical principles. As Schopenhauer further explains, 
our notion that 11 1 can will this" carries along \<1ith it an additional 
clause, "if I did not prefer the other." "But this addition annuls that 
ability to wi 11. 1164 
Perhaps Schopenhauer 1 s greatest distance from Kant is obvious here. 
Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer sees man as an objectification of the primor-
dial will--vJhich means that man is an object, not a subject; therefore, 
like all other objects of experience, man is a phenomenon in space and 
time, and thereby subject to the causal laws of nature. "If freedom of 
the will \<Jere presupposed, every human action would be an inexplicable 
miracle--an effect without a cause. 1165 This is impossible, of course, 
,_ 
in the phenomenal realm v1hich operates under the laws of causality, 
where Schopenhauer defines "cause" itself as the "antecedent change 
which makes the follm'Ving one necessary. 1166 
From the preceding, it would seem as though Schopenhauer had aban-
doned any pretense of a philosophy which could deal with moral matters. 
By denying both the transcendent God of traditional thought, as well as 
the Kantian free will, Schopenhauer at first appears to eliminate all 
possibility of ethical choice from his interpretation of the world. He 
claims that "no system of ethics is possible which moulds and improves 
the will itself. For all teaching onlj affects knowledqe, and knowledpe 
never determines the will itself 1167 But this is not the whole 
picture, since Schopenhauer does believe in ethical responsibility for 
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.the content of one's actions. "From what we do we know what we are. 1168 
It is from this assertion that we achieve consciousness of the responsi-
bility and moral demands of life. "In a word, man does at all times on-
ly what he wills, and yet he does this necessarily. But this is due to 
the fact that he already~ what he wills. 1: 69 Even though we all sub-
jectively believe that we do only what ·we will, this merely means that 
our actions are the pure expressions of our very own being. For Schop-
enhauer firmly contends, as noted before, that it is the will that is 
spoken of whenever 11 111 appears in a judgment. 70 
Although this view may seem to have the cards unfairly stacked a-
gainst the individual who wishes to do "good", this is precisely Schop-
enhauer's point. Because he claims that, "everyone knows his will only 
in its successive acts, and not as a whole, in and for itself; thereforP.. 
no one knows his character a priori, but only learns it through experi-
ence and always i;ncompletely. 1171 By denying us the complete picture of 
what/who we are at any given moment, we may be led to reflect upon our 
own individuation and perceive its illusory nature. If so, we may come 
to the realization that our ego is identical with that of others, and 
that the barriers separating us from others are unreal. Through such 
contemplation, we.would learn that the principle of individuation is 
valid only in the phenomenal world of appearances, and that the true na-
ture of each of us is identical. We would then have compassion (some-
times translated as "pity") for others, for we would see and feel the 
suffering of others as if it were our own--which it is. It is this com-
passion which is the basis of Schopenhauer's morality. 72 
Schopenhauer's distance from Kant is thus irrmense. Not only is his 
universe one in which chaos and the meaningless struggle to survive 
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'Constitute noumenal reality,·but his foundation for morality, in which 
one's ever-changing emotions detennine one's compassion--or the lack 
thereof, is irrational; hence, it is the polar opposite of Kant's "pure 
practical reason". Yet there remains a line of continuity with Kant's 
views, and even with those of Plato, in Schopenhauer's philosophy. He 
sees himself as their successor because they insisted , as he does, up-
on a disparity between what we perceive, (phenomena) and what is "really 
real" (noumena). Furthermore, the content of even our faulty percep-
tions is dependent upon our own intellectual apparatus (Plato's parable 
of The Cave). Thus, Kant's all-important insight that both objects in 
space and time, as well as space and time per se, are conditioned by the 
perceiving subject--and constitue our 11 spectacles 11 --is of primary sig-
nificance for Schopenhauer, too. If, as some thinkers su9gest, 73 the 
motive power behind all philosophy is the need to find something eternal 
behind all change; and if, as Classical philosophers claimed, the more 
lasting and real something was, the greater its perfection, then Scho~­
enhauer achieved his own "transvaluation of values" by positing the ev-
er-striving will as the core of the noumenal reality. For the "essence" 
of all appearances is now seen to be an ever-changing, insatiable appe-
tite for existence, which "wells up" as soon as it is satisfied, and 
constantly seeks new paths of exploitation. In other words, all that is 
truly "eternal" is eternal change and process--but with no meaning, 
"pattern", or "Plan" behind it. In place of the "heavenly reward" for 
morally "good" behavior on earth offered by Christian theolo9ians, or 
the "eternal advancement of mankind" offered by Kant, Schopenhauer pos-
its only the ephemeral feeling of compassion--and the realization that 
·both the suffering, and its amelioration, in others is our own. Thus, 
in Schopenhauer's moral system, to alleviate suffering in another is 
suddenly a:crucial element in alleviating it in ourselves--and this 
seems to be a perfect instance of "enlightened self-interest". 
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As one recent admirer of Schopenhauer explains: "To stand up for 
the temporal against merciless eternity is morality in Schopeobauer's 
sense 11 •74 By postulating blind will as the eternal force--the only 
reality, Schopenhauer 11 unmasks the treachery of the old metaphysiCs by 
showing that ~need is ever compensated for in any Beyond. 1175 For 
Schopenhauer believes that all distinctions of morality are nothing more 
than the creations of ~en, and simply reflect our own feelings and de-
sires within a particular context, at a particular time. 76 In Schopen-
hauer's view, one does not want something because it is "good", but de-
fines it as "good" because he wants it, a point on which Nietzsche con-
curs. In such a vision, a categorical imperative becomes an impossibil-
ity, and Kant's attempt to provide a universal fonn for morality becomes 
an absurdity. For if what is "good" is whatever an individual desires 
at any moment, it can have no universal applicability. The whole idea 
of a categorical imperative is, in fact, a logical impossibility to 
Schopenhauer, since all imperatives are due to some condition in the 
phenomenal realm; therefore, an "unconditioned imperative" is a contra-
diction in tenns, 77 and any attempt to impose a moral law on basically 
irrational beings is of little use. 
Thus, while Kant's ethical system is one of imperative reason, with 
an abstract a priori basis, Schopenhauer's is one of compassionate feel-
ing, based on actual experience. 78 Where Kant scorns an empirical basis 
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·for ethics in either feelings or inclinations, and instead locates it in 
the noumena l character of rat tonal; bei:ngs :.whb· are:...:autcmom0us ::membeEs :of= 
the moral order, Schopenhauer shifts the focus and maintains that moral-
ity, to have any real significance, must be rooted in real human experi-
ences. Although this appears to be a reasonable request, the practical 
consequences of Schopenhauer's system show only the insignificance of 
the human condition altogether. His ethical theory, which is based on 
sympathy, compassion, or 11 pity11 with the condition of others who are 
trapped, as we are, in a world of illusion--whose only "purpose" is to 
manifest the purposeless force of the noumenal will--leads to, at best, 
self-effacement at the prospect of such a pessimistic world view. 79 At 
worst, it seems to lead to a desire for self-obliteration and the even-
tual extinction of all life. For Schopenhauer appears to be saying that 
the annihilation of individuality is desirable, if only temporarily pos-
sible; and since this individuality is only an objectification of the 
metaphysical will, the annihilation of this noumenal will is also desir-
able--although permanently impossible. While this derogation of reason 
as a mere tool which the will employs to achieve its own temporary sat-
isfaction and security may have helped topple reason from its unequalled 
elevation at the hands of Enlightenment thinkers, it did so at the.ex-
pense of providing any 11 reason 11 why this nothingness--this annihilation 
of the will and its manifestations--was preferable to anything else, no 
matter how illusory. 
In any case, one must wonder how such a pessimistic philosophy 
could develop from its purportedly KanUan roots i.n 1 ittle· mc~e bhan:.a 
decade after Kant's death. How did Plato's 11 ideas 11 become, in Schopen-
hauer's system, "incurably gluttonous 11 , 80 and serve only as nourishment 
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·for .the will? Some twentieth century thinkers have sunnised that Schop-
enhauer's theories grew out his "hatred for the indecent optimism of the 
contemporary demagogy of progress, 1181 while others have seen his own 
"passionate temperament" and bitter personal experiences as "conspir-
ing to suggest to Schopenhauer the primacy and ultimacy of the will. 1182 
Ce~tainly Kant's philosophical "revolution", as well as the course of 
the French Revolution, illuminated the limits of reason in ways previ-
ously unknown, while Rousseau's emphasis on the power of our emotions, 
and Napoleon's rise to political power and predominance within Europe 
illustrated the dynamic, forceful nature of change. But, unfortunately, 
within the first decade and a half of the new century, Napoleon's defeat 
at Waterloo and the reactionary character of the Congress of Vienna in 
1815 seemed to exemplify Voltaire's dictum: "The more things change, 
the more they remain the same." It may be that these political events 
paved the way for Schopenhauer's pessimistic vision, or at least enabled 
him to perceive the illusory nature of much of the phenomenal realm. 
This, coupled with his "imperfect understanding" of Indian philosophy,83 
perhaps facilitated Schopenhauer's postulation of will as the only real-
ity. Whatever factors, or combinations thereof, were responsible for 
the fonnation of his thought, Schopenhauer left a philosophical legacy 
which was itself later transformed by the works of Nietzsche into a vi-
.. 
sion of exhilarating possibilities. 
Nietzsche 
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Nietzsche's philosophical views, as they were articulated in the 
latter half of the 19th century, are both a continuation and a rejection 
of those of Kant and Schopenhauer. It is their works which provide Niet-
zsche vii th certain insights and vocabulary, as v1ell as with enemies to 
overcome. Yet this fundamental similarity of interest is easily obscured 
by Nietzsche's radically different style, methodology, and conclusions, 
and by his later repudiation of much of Schopenhauer's teaching. For 
Nietzsche uses the thought of Kant and Schopenhauer as a springboard to 
take off on a purportedly new direction for thought, thereby givinq the 
will a new appearance as well. It is, therefore, necessary to begin 
with a brief overview of Nietzsche's project as a whole. 
Central to rJietzsche's ne\•J course in philosophical inquiry is his 
claim that it is our language which is responsible for many of the mud-
dled metaphysical systems which are oerennially soringing up in the 
quest for "truth" and 11 reality'1 • Nietzsche sees the problem as t\•'o-fold. 
First, he contends that our minds are dominated by the grammatical 
structure of our language. We impose the subject/predicate relationship, 
whereby every predicate requires a subject, onto the structure of the 
world at lar~e; therefore, we demand that every action requires an agent. 
The consequences of this projection of our own inability to comprehend 
the world in any other terms are profound. It is this subject/oredicate 
relationship which is actually the basis for the distinction between the 
noumenal and phenomenal realms. Nevertheless, this distinction is one 
, 
that rests on erroneous reasoning, and is therefore, rejected by Niet-
zsche. Instead, he suggests that: "Once we understand that the subject 
is an invention, the opposition between Ding, an Sich !.~ubject-in-itself~ 
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and appearance becomes untenable--so that the concept of appearance 
collapses. 1184 Perhaps Nietzsche's refusal to accept the Kantian distinc-
tion between noumena and phenomena is responsible for his denial of all 
such dualistic interpretations of the world as equally false and irrele-
vant. As he explains, "there is no 'being' behind the doing, acting, 
and becoming; the 'doer' has simply been added to the deed by the imaq-
ination--the doing is everything. 1185 
The second stumbling block is our necessity of thinking in words, 
which we use as thouqh they were actually explanations of thinQs, and 
from which we are thereby able to derive "knowledae 11 • But Nietzsche 
denies that this is, in fact, the case. He believes that the·roots of 
this problem lie in the prehistoric past, and originated because the 
"sculptor of language was not so modest as to believe that he was only 
giving things designations, he conceived rather that with words he was 
expressing supreme knowledge of things. 1186 Nietzsche rejects this as-
sumption, and claims: "'Thingness' was first created by us 11 •87 This 
means that the fundamental relationship of all "things" is that of "be-
ing-an-object-for-an-interpreting-subject, 1188 and our interpretations 
are of paramount importance in determining what we "know." 
Moreover, Nietzsche contends that knowledqe "is not to 'know' but 
to schematize--to impose upon chaos as much regularity and fonn as suf-
fices for our practical requirements. 1189 The very fact that we do con-
ceptualize and impose our own language-9ased schema on our world, which 
is otherwise senseless and fonnless, is not only necessary; it is also 
an example of our will to power--our human need to order and structure 
our universe, and thus preserve our sense of dignity and importance. 
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And we are not distinct from what we interpret or do. We are will to 
power, for our interpretation of this world is a mode of imposition, a 
means by which we exert our power over our world, and attempt to beco~e 
master over it. The world is, therefore, something that we make and 
re-make, and has no meaning or structure other than what we give it. 
Hence, Nietzsche's assertion: "Against positivism, which halts at phen-
omena--'There are only facts'--! would say: No, facts are precisely what 
there are not, only interpretations. 1190 Obviously, Nietzsche's emphasis 
on interpretation as one mode of the will to power sug~ests a very dif-
ferent view of will from those of Kant and Schopenhauer. 
Furthennore, among these interpretations, or perspectives, which we 
have created, are the "laws" of science and mathematics, including the 
canons of logical argument and deduction. Nietzsche maintains that log-
ic itself is nothing more than a scheme to make our world comprehendable 
to us, and really "rests on presuppositions with which nothing in the 
actual world corresponds. 1191 But logic and science, althouqh-fictitious 
and erroneous, nevertheless are necessary for the preservation and en-
hancement of mankind. 92 And language, for all its limitations, is sim-
. . 
ilarly essential, for without it: "we cease to think when we refuse to 
do so under the constraint of language Rational thought is inter-
pretation according to a scheme we can not jettison. 1193 
Nietzsche, therefore, resigns himself to the use of a faulty tool, 
language--because that is the only instrument available--to communicate 
his philosophical insights. At the same time, since he perceives that 
language necessarily simplifies and thus distorts what it interprets, 
Nietzsche attempts to limit its potential for falsification 94 by utiliz-
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.i ng:.·the·:st,Ylistic ·.devices,: of·:a·phori.sms-::atfd· 11thou·ght :experirilents 11 ' .to·'dfs; . 
close his views. This is in direct opposition to the systematic studies 
of the "essence" of reality undertaken by Kant and Schopenhauer, which 
are "suspicious" to Nietzsche because they assume the veracity of lin-
guistic and logical constructs. He even goes so far as to suqgest that, 
"The will to a system is a lack of integrity. 1195 
Yet Nietzsche's approach is more than merely a reflection of this 
anti-systematic bias. Aphorisms and thought experiments are especially 
well-suited to conveying various perspectives and interpretations, and 
easily enable Nietzsche to adopt and discard notions freely. Perhaps of 
equal benefit, is their discontinuous nature, which Nietzsche finds 
helpful in his attempts to disturb, and hopefully awaken, the thought 
processes of his intellectually "lazy" audience. 96 This is, obviously, 
a very different project from those of Kant and Schopenhauer, and thus 
necessitates a different methodology. Nietzsche explains this new di-
rection to philosophical inquiry, and the dangers inherent in such pur-
suits, in his preface to Daybreak (1887): 11 In this book you wi 11 dis-
cover a 'subterranean man' at work, one who tunnels and mines and under-
mines.1197 This is not only an apt description of Nietzsche's method of 
seeking out the psychological and sociological origins of beliefs and 
systems (as opposed to their "essences"); but also illustrates the cor-
rosive impact of his views on those of traditional philosophic thought. 98 
Before proceeding with an examination of Nietzsche's notion of the 
will, however, it may be helpful to outline a few of the individual 
debts--and later differences--which Nietzsche's thought owed to Kant and 
Schopenhauer. Initially, Kant's influence on Nietzsche appears to be 
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more difficult to discern than. Schopenhauer's. Yet Kant's attempt to 
provide a "metaphysics of experience" was to have a pronounced effect on 
Nietzsche's own work. 99 Central to this were Kant's ~ritique and limita-
tion of reason, and his focus on the will. Kant's disclosure that tra-
ditional metaphysical speculations {which aimed at establishing the 
existence of God, immortal ityof the. soul, etc.) were unattainable be-
cause they were beyond all human experience and knowledge, however, con-
tained a hidden element of "implicit agnosticism" which was not lost on 
Ni~tzsche. lOO Additionally, Kant's Copernican R~volution in philosophy 
held that the noumenal realm was forever outside of our possible knowl-
edge, which was itself dependent on what we, as human beings, actually 
are and do with our sensory imfonnation. Nietzsche accepts both of 
these Kantian notions: that we make a subjective contribution to experi-
ence, and therefore to knowledge; and that we can never know the noumen-
a 1 (or "true") world. Al though Ni etzsc.he adapts these concepts to ac-
c01T1Tiodate his own theories, nevertheless, it is these Kantian insights 
which underlie his own insistence upon the interpretive and perspectival 
nature of "truth", art, science, and mathematics. 
But Nietzsche's overall reaction to the Kantian view that our knowl-
edge is unable to transcend the limits of our own senses and experiences 
is profoundly different from Kant's. Instead of Kant's faint-hearted 
attempt to limit reason and thereby make room for 11 faith 11 , Nietzsche de-
cides to limit his own investigations to the phenomenal realm, the ap-
parent world, which is the only one that we can ever "know". Nietzsche 
realizes that this choice requires the courage to acknowledge that there 
is no eternal realm to which we may ever aspire. Yet he sees his direc-
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tion as preferable to Kant's deplorable contention that reason only 
knows that it can never hope to comprehend the noumenal realm. Nietzsche 
finds Kant's claim to be both a continuation of the traditional "perver-
sion of philosophy," and a form of sadistic pleasure in which "reason in 
its self-contempt and self-mockery decrees that the realm of truth does 
indeed exist, but that reason is debarred from it. 11101 Nietzsche de-
' 
cides that Kant's entire notion of the noumenal realm is fatally flawed 
and hopelessly confused. 
Nietzsche sees Kant's two mistakes to be his concepts of causality 
and noumena. Nietzsche claims that "there is no such thing as a sense 
of causality, as Kant thinks. The supposed instinct for causality is 
only fear of the unfamiliar, and the attempt to discover something fa-
miliar in it--is a search, not for causes, but for the familiar. 11102 We 
have merely combined our feelings of freedom, will, responsibility, and 
intention to perform certain acts into a single concept of "cause", and 
then proceeded to "explain" events whenever any condition was detected 
in which that event was already contained. "In fact, we invent all 
causes after the schema of the effects--the latter is known to us. 11103 
What gives us our firm belief in causality, however, is not just our 
habit of seeing one event following another (as Hume suggested), "but 
our inability to interpret events other than as events caused by our own 
. t t' .. 104 in en 10ns. It is, therefore, this inability that induces us to pos-
it will and intention as the only effec~ive forces, and then allows us 
to interpret every event as a "deed," each of which presupposes a causal 
1 ink with its "doer." 
As to Kant's noumenal confusions, Nietzsche criticizes these along 
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the same lines that Schopenhauer had previously examined. Since Kant 
held that the principle of causality did not apply between the realms of 
noumena and phenomena, he could not infer the existence of noumena by 
such a principle. Because noumena are not the direct objects of percep-
tion or intuition (in opposition to Schopenhauer's notion of will), 
they are "empty" concepts, i.e., they are concepts without precepts. In 
addition, Nietzsche argues that nothing can exist independently of other 
things, and something that does exist in such a manner (a "thing-in-it-
self") is a thing without properties or, in other words, "no-thing. 11105 
Thus, Kant's whole notion of a 11 thing-in-itself 11 is just as perverse to 
Nietzsche as a "sense-in-itself" or a "meaning-·in-itself. 11 Nietzsche 
argues: "There are no 'facts..:in-themsel ves 1 , for a sense must always be 
projected into them before they can be facts. 11106 
So far, Nietzsche's critiques of Kant's mistaken ideas of causality 
and noumena have been supported by his theory that language itself dis-
torts and falsifies what it attempts to explain. But there is an addi-
tional element in his rejection of Kant's dualism. Nietzsche perceives 
that the notion of an inaccessible real or true world acts to degrade 
and impoverish this world. Since Nietzsche views the world as a total-
ity, he investigates the roots of this dualistic theory, and detennines 
that concepts such as: "This apparent, phenomenal world is not the 'real 
world 111 are actually based on "Contempt, and hatred for all that perish-
h . 11107 es, c anges, varies ... He further explores the "psychology of 
metaphysics" to find where such a "valuation of that which remains cons-
tant" originates. Nietzsche concludes: 
This world is apparent, consequently, there is a true world; 
--this world is conditioned, consequently there is an uncondi-
tioned world ... this world is one of becoming, therefore, 
there is a world of being--all false conclusions (because of 
the blind trust in reason: if A exists, then the opposite 
concept B must also exist)(somewhere). It is suffering that 
inspires these conclusions: fundamentally, they are desires 
that such a world should exist: similarly, to imagine another 
more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world 
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that makes one suffer: the15§ssentiment of metaphysics against • actuality is here creative. 
Against this Kantian "resentment" of reality, Nietzsche turns to 
Schopenhauer, who at least accepts the necessity of suffering. Nietz~ 
sche, an admitted "disciple" of Schopenhauer for a time, admits in Ecce 
. 109 Homo (1888) that, "It was atheism that had drawn me to Schopenhauer." 
But this is only one of a number of factors involved in Nietzsche's early 
enthusiam for Schopenhauer's thought. Some of these are the more subtle 
elements of influence which Nietzsche discusses in his essay "Schopen-
hauer as Educator" (1874). Here Nietzsche cites "his [Schopenhauer's] 
honesty, his joy, and his consistency 11 ,lI:O and also praises Schopenhau-
er's persistence in upholding the truth of his "unacceptable" philosophy. 
11 He 1 was absolutely alone, with no'-single friend of his own kind to com-
fort him; and between one and none there lies an infinity--as ever be-
tween something and nothing. 11111 The analogies with Nietzsche's own 
"acceptance" (or lack thereof) in philosophical circles, and of his sol-
itary lifestyle are striking, and Nietzsche undoubtedly felt some af-
finity with this man he described as his "deliverer. 11112 Even Nietz-; 
sche's outrage over the attempts of his contemporaries to "adapt" Scho-
penhauer's thought to their "enervated"' age is, in light of Nietzsche's 
own subsequent use/abuse, prescient as well as poignant. In a passage 
which might have described Nietzsche's later fate~ he reveals that 11 the 
new danger has gradually arisen of regarding him (Schopenhaued as an 
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odd kind of pungent herb, of taking him in grains, as a sort of meta-
physical pepper. 11113 
But the significance of Schopenhauer's impact on Nietzsche's own 
thought lies in the vision of a universe without purpose or ultimate 
meaning, dominated by human suffering and frustration, and itself merely 
the expression of a blind will. Such a world, which can only be glimpsed 
through the subjective perception that we are this will, is not a ration-
al structure created by some divine or law-abiding intellect. Further-
more, this view proves that the human intellect, (the 11 servant 11 of the 
wi 11) can not be an 11 autonomous entity. 11114 With this i nsi qht, Schopen-
hauer not only questioned Kant's emphasis on reason and will as autono-
mous faculties, but negated Hegel's claim that the real was rational, 
and the rational was real. Nietzsche was forever indebted to Schopen-
hauer for this illumination of the irrational will as the only reality, 
with all of its atheistic implications, and for the subordination of the 
intellect to the will. 
Ironically, it is in reference to Schopenhauer's own most highly 
valued belief that Nietzsche failed to acquiesce. Schopenhauer took 
great pride in having attained the 11 one true insight 11 that had eluded 
Kant--the knowledge that the noumenal reality was the will. Although a 
detailed exposition of Nietzsche's version of will is to be found in a 
later section, suffice it to say that Schopenhauer's metaphysical "will 
to live 11 is similar in word only to Nietzsche's physiological complex of 
--- , 
drives which, because it enters consciousness as one sensation, is des-
ignated by the single word 11 will . 11115 Against Schopenhauer's claim that 
only the will is really known to us, Nietzsche asserts the complexity of 
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the very notion of wi 11: "Wi 11 i ng seems to me to be above a 11 something 
complicated, something that is a unit only as a word .. 116 
As Nietzsche explains: "Sc.hopenhauer's basic misunderstanding of 
the will {as if craving, instinct, drive were the essence of will) is 
typical ... for will is precisely that which treats cravings as their 
master and appoints to them their way and measure. 11117 The source of 
this misunderstanding is Schopenhauer's belief in the noumenal/phenomenal 
dualism; therefore, he falls into the same basic error as Kant. Because 
of this, however, Schopenhauer has corrmitted yet another error when he 
suggests that "the only way to the 'true', to knowledge; lies in gettin!l 
free from affects, from will 11118 This leads Schopenhauer to preach 
the renunciation of will and the denial of life itself--unpardonable sins 
in Nietzsche's.eyes.· The consequences of Schopenhauer's chaotic, irra-
tional, meaningless reality are anathema to Nietzsche. 119 For Schopen-
hauer aims at an ascetic suppression of all desires through the compas-
sionate contemplation of the suffering of all life fonns. When Nietzsche 
finally realizes that Schopenhauer's "joy" is one of resignation, rather 
than his own one of creative affirmation, he breaks with the bulk of 
Schopenhauer's thought. Hereafter, Nietzsche refers to Schopenhauer's 
teachings in such uncomplimentary tenns as "lunatic interpretations"; 
or in incensed passages where Nietzsche rails against the absurdity of: 
"The 'denial of life' as an aim of life, an aim of evolution! Existence 
as a great stupidity! 11120 
Nietzsche thus accepts Kant's notion that we detennine the world, 
and Schopenhauer's contention that the will is central to that detennina-
tion. But the world in which the will acts is strictly phenomenal, and 
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our interpretation of it is just another instance of will to power--of 
the release of life's essential fundamental energies. To Nietzsche, there 
is nothing more fundamental in man or nature than this will to power, 
which transforms its environment in order to survive. 121 It is only drive 
that is basic to all living beings, and Nietzsche takes care to differ-
entiate it from Schopenhauer's 11 will to survive." Nietzsche detects the 
cardinal instinct of all beings to lie in their discharge of strength--
their will to power--not in their own self-preservation; consequently, 
"self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most freo.uent re-
sults. ~1122 In Nietzsche's version, something does not struggle to sur-
vive, as Schopenhauer and Darwin ~ight say, but survives to struggle. 
For the will to power is not merely~ drive among others (like self-pres-
ervation, sex, or hunger), but a generic trait of all creatures, of 
which the other drives are but modes. 
Nietzsche tries to reconcile his notion of will to power as a prin-
ciple of life with his notion that will is something that is a unit only 
as a word. Nietzsche claims that will to power is distinguishe~ from 
desiring, demanding, and striving by the "affect of command. 11123 He 
further discusses this problem in his notes written in 1887-1888: "Is 
the 1 will to power' a· kind of 'will' or identical with the concept of 
'will 1 ? Is it the same thing as desiring? or commanding? 11124 
Nietzsche then responds to these questions, and to the suggestion that 
will to power is still Schopenhauer's noumenal will, in the following 
ways: the "will" so described does not exist at all; such a "psycholog-
ical description" of will is an "unjustified generalization"; and the 
character of the will is eliminated by subtracting its goal--its 11 whith-
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er 11 --from its content. Nietzsche argues that this is precisely what 
Schopenhauer did in his system, v1ith the fina1 result that 11 will 11 became 
nothing more than an empty word. 125 ,. 
Yet this answer is surely insufficient to the task of explaining 
the confusion between will to power as a kind of metaphysical principle, 
or as a phenomenological observation. Nietzsche appears to use will in 
the first sense when he exclaims: "This world is will to power--and 
nothing beside! And you yourself are also this will to power--and noth-
ing beside! 11126 And he employs it in the second sense when he suggests 
that will 11 is only a simplifying conception of the understanding, as is 
'matter' . 11127 It is with this latter understanding in mind that Nietzsche 
frequently reminds us: "There is no such thi nq as 1v1i ll', but only a 
willed something: one must not remove the aim from the total condition--
as epistemologists do .. 11 1_28 
It appears a-s though Nietzsche's use of "will" depends upon his top-
ical -concern of the moment. When he reveals that, ·"The inner world is 
ful 1 of spooks . the will is one of these•! 129 , he is arguing against 
the existence of all 11 faculties 11 , including the will in its Kantian garb. 
He offers, instead, an empirical explanation of our behavior. Nietzsche 
finds that since we usually behave in reasonably predictable ways, we 
get habits of expectation. Repeated successful predictions give us a 
sense of power, and we then explain our behavior by believino that it is 
our will which is causing our actions. But, in liaht of his other views 
on the mistaken concept of causality, Nietzsche concludes that this is 
i 11 usory. For our human 11 rea 1 i ty 11 is nothing more than a 11 bundl e of oas-
sions and drives, 11 many of which we are either unconscious of, or wrong 
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about, and nothing else is 11 real 11 except our drives. 130 ~Jhat Nietzsche 
means by such statements is that the wi 11 does not 11 exi st11 in any no um-
enal sense, just as Soul, Reason, Spirit, Truth, or Thinking do not exist 
separately from the human animal who uses such concepts to help in his 
interpretation of the world. 131 These are all "fictions", but they de-
rive their psychological utility from their ability to protect our 11 egos 11 
from vanishing in the multiplicity of change. 132 In this sense, it seems 
reasonable for Nietzsche to include 11 will 11 in his list of "tremendous 
b 1unders, 11 for he sees that it is v~i 11 which is a h1ays invoked whenever 
there are 11 effects 11 to be explained. 133 
But no matter how useful will may be as a psychological hypothesis 
to explain human behavior, it has other functions of equal imoortance to 
Nietzsche's overall philosophical project. When he uses will to power 
in a metaphysical sense (as the basis for us and our world), the will 
becomes a unifying monistic principle available for use in his constant 
b 1 . h 1 . d . f d 1 . . . t t t. 135 att e against t e ife- enying prospects o ua istic in erpre a ions. 
When he employs it in Zarasthustra as the 11 will to overcome oneself, 11 
will to power serves as the means by which we can transform ourselves, 
and our world, for the better. And when Nietzsche says: "To impose up-
on becoming the character of being--that is the supreme will to power, 11136 
he is using it in yet another sense--that of interpretation. As he re-
veals: "It is a measure of the degree of strength of will to what ex-
tent one can do without meaning in things, to what extent one can endure 
to live in a meaningless world because one organizes a small portion of 
it oneself. 11137 And this, I think, is the best vJa.Y of making sense of 
Nietzsche's contradictory statements. 138 
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If, contrary to John Locke's belief, it is not our minds which are 
tabula rasa, but our very world, then Nietzsche's attempt to interpret 
this world--to impose a structure and meaning on the otherwise 11 blank 
senselessness of reality"--becomes an admirable one. To will means to 
will "something" (as opposed to Schopenhauer's view); our world, there-
fore, awaits our creation for its very value and significance. But this 
demands an extraordinary effort on our part, as Nietzsche admits: "I 
assess man by the quantum of power and the abundance of his will I 
assess the power of a will by hmv much resistance, pain, torture it en-
dures and knows how to turn to its advantage ... 11139 This latter sug-
gestion, that we must know how to turn our suffering to our "advantage'', 
is crucial. Suffering per se is not admirable to Nietzsche (more on 
this later) as it was to Schopenhauer, but overcominq our necessary suf-
fering is. And one way to do this is to impose our will--our interpre-
tation--on our world. What Nietzsche ultimately offers us is an inter-
pretation of our attempts to interpret the world. Of course, if every-
thing is an interpretation (not 11 the 11 interpretation), then Nietzsche's 
own "thought experiment", suggesting the will to power as the basis of 
all interpretation, is likewise 11 only an interpretation. 11 This is not, 
however, an objection. For Nietzsche remarks: 11 Supposi nq that this a 1-
so is on 1 y i nterpreta ti on . . well, so much the better. 11140 
Nietzsche, nevertheless, is not content with offering only interpre-
tations and perspectives on our human plight. He still seeks to uncover 
the 11 original 11 motives behind such doctrines as the will. Nietzsche 
discovers that our habit of tracing everything back to a "will, an in-
tention, a responsible act 11 actually was invented for the sake of oun-
ishment. 
It was the social utility of punishment that guaranteed this 
concept its dignity, its power, its truth. The originators of 
this psychology--the psychology of will--are to be sought in 
the classes that administer penal law, and the priests--they 
wanted to create for themselves a riaht to take revenqe--want-
ed to create a right for God to take~revenge. To this end, 
man was seen as 1 free 1 ; to this end, every action had to be 
co~ceiv!~ 1of as willed, the origin of every action as con-scious. 
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While such a bald assertion initially appears to be patently false, 
Nietzsche unearths the heretofore hidden connection between our alleged 
"free \.'Jill" and punishment. He finds that the entire theory of responsi-
bility (which assumes free will for our acts) depends upon the false pre-
supposition that one is responsible only for what one has willed. When 
Nietzsche develops this theory more fully he observes: "there must be a 
principle in man, a 'free will', as first cause; for if man is not a 
first cause as will, then he is irresponsible--therefore, he has no 
business before the moral tribunal ... In summa: so that man may re-
t h . l f h t b bl f d . · 1 11142 spec imse , e mus e capa e o 01ng ev1 . 
Nietzsche thus tackles this persistent problem of the freedom of 
the will which has troubled thinkers since the time of Paul, but he does 
so with a typical twist. Instead of the tradi ti ona l focus on our ability 
to choose between good and evil, (which assumes that the greater benefit 
accrues to those \'1ho choose the "good"), Nietzsche focusses on the ef-
fects of our ability to do "evil". And these effects have to do more 
with the sociological consequences of such actions, than with the ethi-
cal issues supposedly involved. By locatin9 the origin of this theory 
cf free will in the motivation for revenge of those who wielded social/ 
political power, Nietzsche sets the stage for his contention that the 
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will to power erases all distinctions between good and evil. The whole 
system of punishments and rewards is no more than the attempt, by those 
in power, to maintain and solidify their control over others, and is 
simply the manifestation of their own will to power. Those unlucky e-
nough to be punished are merely used as the means by which others are 
warned against performing similar acts. They are not punished because 
they 11 deserve 11 it, but because it serves the interests of those in pow-
143 
er. 
Unlike his philosophical predecessors, whose primary concern with 
the freedom of the will purportedly was derived from their interest in 
the normative consequences attending such theories, Nietzsche's concern 
is with the psychological sources of these concepts: this gives him a 
different angle from which to attack the prevailing notions. From this 
perspective, he discovers that this doctrine of free will, (which he 
describes as a "hundred-times refuted theoryn, 144 or as an "erroneous 
article of faith'' inherited from our primordial ancestors), 145 actually 
serves several different psychological needs. Again, depending upon his 
particular topic of consideration, Nietzsche ascertains that our feelin9 
of free will originated in our sense of pride, power, and strength; 146 
or, alternatively, in our need to justify cruelty and give meaning to 
the suffering of ourselves and others. 147 
Although Nietzsche understands the motives behind such impulses, he 
believes that they rest on a basic misunderstanding of our real psycho-
logical processes and requirements--which he explains in terms of our 
will to power. He perceives that, at one time, there were benefits to 
be gained for all of us from the priestly and ascetic interpretations of 
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our suffering, for: 1' The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering it-
self, was the curse which hitherto lay spread out over mankind ... 11148 
And Nietzsche believes that any meaning was (and still is) preferable to 
no meaning at all. Yet Nietzsche argues that there are many 11meanings 11 
to be offered, and that the one suggested by the fallacious notion of 
free will is the "foulest of all theologians' artifices, aimed at making 
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mankind responsible in their sense, that is, dependent upon them. 11 
It is a 11 lie 11 which even the priests know to be a lie, but one which 
150 they have found useful in perserving their power over others. But 
Nietzsche's real antipathy to this doctrine lies in its fundamental con-
nection with Christian morality, which he seeks to re-evaluate because 
of its insidious, life-negating consequences. In fact, Nietzsche sees 
the entire history of moral valuations as the "history of an error, the 
error of responsibility, which is based upon the error of the freedom of 
the will 11. 151 
To understand how an error of such magnitude arose, (the results 0f 
which are, to Nietzsche, still adversely affectin9 our comorehension of 
our world and ourselves, and thus are supremely important to his 01;1m 
project) it is necessary to digress and look first at Nietzsche's examin-
ation of the morals of the ancient and the Christian worlds. The great 
disparity between these valuations convinces Nietzsche that there is no 
single morality, but only different moralities. This conclusion results 
in his denial of the existence of any "essential good 11 , and i 11 ustrates 
~ietzsche's contention that moral values are phenomena, i.e., made for 
and by us in our everyday world--which is the only one there is. But 
there is an element in common 1t1hich both the ancient and Christian moral-
ities share: the concept of "obedience to a command". ''To be moral, 
virtuous, ethical means to obey a long-established law or tradition. 
Whether one obeys gladly or reluctantly is immaterial: it is enough 
that one obeys . . Nietzsche thus reveals that it is the act of 
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obeying a command, rather than the nature of that command--its content--
\~hich has been of primary importance in moral matters. He also claims 
that, "To become moral is not in itself moral 11 , 153 since we may do so 
for a variety of reasons--from despair, or self-interest, or vanity, or 
"slavish obedience". And these insights seem to place Nietzsche closer 
to Kant than we might initially expect. For both are insisting on the 
primacy of the fonn of the command (Kant 1 s categorical imperative) in 
moral valuations; and on the importance of obeying such a command for 
its own sake. 
Yet these similarities do not obscure the profound differences be-
tween their views. Kant's pronouncements carry an implicit (and some-
times explicit) 11 ought 11 in their content. That is, the cate9orical im-
perative ought to be followed for its own sake, regardless of any specif-
ic content. Nietzsche 1 s remarks, however, do not carry a similar burden, 
since he is making observations instead of exhortations. He is not in-
terested, at least at this point, in suggesting what we "should" be do-
ing, but rather in revealing the psychological origins of what we are 
doing. Of even greater significance is ,Nietzsche 1 s claim that morality 
is merely another one of the various constructs which we impose upon 
certain phenomena. And here he irrevocably parts company from Kant. To 
Nietzsche, moral values are simply matters of opinion, i.e., interpreta-
ti ons. As such, they lack the noumena 1 reality and respectabi 1 i ty \'!i th 
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which Kant clothes them, for they are nothinq more than the ''sign-lang-
uage of the feelings 11 • 154 
But if "morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedi-
ence to customs 11 , 155 why is Nietzsche so opposed to the Christian and, 
because of his similar intent, the Kantian 11 interpretations 11 and tradi-
tional 11 customs 11 ? It seems, at first, unfair for Nietzsche to single 
these out as the objects of his venomous re-evaluation of values, espec-
ially in light of his own insistence on the importance of interpretations 
and perspectives. Nietzsche explains his position in the following ways. 
On the one hand, he reminds us that, "Actions are never what they appear 
to us to be! We have expended so much labor on learning that external 
things are not as they appear to us to be 11 ; 156 yet we have refused to 
apply similar reasonin9 to our "inner world", and perceive that it is 
the motivations behind our moral actions which are ''essentially un-
known11.157 We thus act as if we had gained a profound insight into the 
11 real 11 world, and succumb to the delusion that there is only one, abso-
lute, 11 true 11 moral world order. Yet this is as mistaken a notion as was 
primitive man's attempt to assign gender to all things: "In the same 
way man has ascribed to all that exists a connection with morality and 
laid an ethical significance on the world's back. One day this will 
have as much value, and no more, as the belief in the masculinity or 
femininity of the sun has today. 11158 
Hhat both the Christian and Kantian systems fail to perceive is 
that we are biological beings, po\'1ered by drives which are themselves 
transformed by moral judgments. The very same drive can be viewed as 
either cmrnrdly or humble, because a drive has "neither this moral char-
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acter at all, nor even a definite attendant sensation of pleasure or 
displeasure: it acquires all this ... only when it enters into rela-
tions with drives already baptized good or evil ...• .i 59 For example, 
Nietzsche reveals that the early Greeks sa1-1 "envy" as good, and "hope" 
as "deceitful and blind," \'Jhile the Christians regarded them exactly op-
. t 160 N. t h h . h . k f . f pos1 e. ie zsc e emp as1zes t e m1sta en nature o most notions o 
morality when he discloses that even the drive to distinction is not 
~1hat it appears to be. It is actually a form of "refined cruelty", in 
which our O\'Jn wi 11 to power seeks to awaken feelings of envy and impo-
tence in others in the face of our greater virtue and perfection. And 
even our "holiest" saints are not exempt from these motives: ''The chas-
ti ty of the nun: with v.ihat punitive eyes it l oaks into the faces of 
women who live otherwise! how much joy in revenqe there is in these 
eyes!"161 
Not only is Christian morality mistaken in what it venerates, but 
it is inconsistent and irrational, since it condemns that which it pre-
supposes--our "life forces." But, what is even more repulsive to Nietz-
sche, Christianity is "hostile to life" itself because it sees normal 
human behavior as "sinful." Furthermore, it is sclf-ri9hteously ignor-
ant of its own motivations. While Christianity claims that egoi~m and 
will to power are evil, it actually represents the egoism and will to 
power of the slavish and weak. Although Christianity admits that cruelty 
is evil, its own virtues are achieved by self-cruelty and torture. And 
when it denounces our human passions and instincts, Christianity fails 
to perceive that its own denunciation is a product of these very same 
forces. 162 Christianity thus takes as "absolute truth" what is psycho-
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logically and empirically false. Even worse, this adoption of 11 absolute 11 
standards results in the relegation of all different standards to the 
realm of 11 lies, 11 where any other claims to 11 truth 11 are negated. Yet 
Christianity 1 s very refusal to recognize that 11 all of life is based on 
semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspec-
tive and error 11163 encourages Nietzsche to develop his O\'m project--the 
transvaluation of values. This is of the ultimate importance, because 
11 we need to choose between doing a\A1ay with our venerations--or with our-
selves!11164 
As the first step in this transvaluation of values, Nietzsche ar-
gues that it is our will to power, the aggressive dynamic of life itself, 
which is the real foundation of morals, as it is of all else. In opoo-
sition to Kant 1 s examination of our a priori moral foundations, Nietzsche 
claims that moral values are formed a posteriori, since they develop out 
of the contingencies of individual responses to constantly changinq sit-
uations. What is naturally ''good" is \.'1hatever enables man to realize 
his needs. For, 11 All truly noble morality 9rov1s out of triumphant self-
affi rma ti on 11165 As evidence for this surprising contention, Nietz-
sche cites the evidence gained from his own exploration into the oriain 
of such words as 11 good 11 and 11 bad 11 • He suggests, on the basis of his 
discoveries, that the vmrds for 11 good 11 all initially meant 11 noble 11 or 
11 aristocratic 11 in the "social sense", i.e., as a social group; and that 
the words for 11 bad 11 originally meant 11 ~lebian 11 , or one of a low social 
order. 166 He uses the German term 11 schlecht 11 (bad) as an example, and 
finds that it is 11 etymolo9ically identical 11 \Alith the word 11 schlicht 11 
(plain, simple). 167 But unfortunately, this original morality, which 
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vias based upon the natural strength and will to power of the "nobles" (o 
term that supports his identification of "good" vlith "aristocratic"), 
has been overthrown. 
There has been a "slave revolt'' in morals, whereby the rancor and 
resentment of weaker men have become creative and given birth to the val-
ues which are dominant in Western civilizations today. The will to pow-
er of the impotent has disguised itself by hiding behind such notions as 
11 spirituality11 or "compassion", and then used these concepts as a means 
of triumphing over the strong. Nietzsche proclaims that the powerless 
have embraced these ideals solely because they offer the weak an indi-
rect way of attaining power over others. Nietzsche further reveals that 
such ideals as compassion or pity are really the most agreeable feelings 
of power known to those who are without any prospects of greater con-
quests. Yet this will to power of the weak is essentially of a different 
kind of wi 11 from that of the strong, for it is an impotent form of row-
er that actually disparages the concept of power per se, and offers 
nothing positive to replace the toppled paragon of strength. But, what 
is even a greater sign of debasement and degeneracy, the weak arouse the 
feelings of pity in others with the fundamental objective of hurting 
them, of causing others to share in their own sufferino through the very 
act of comprehending such misery. The weak thereby exhibit their own 
168 power over the strong. 
Nietzsche thus unmasks not only the psychological perversity behind 
such Christian "virtues" as compassion and suffering, but also 'illumi-
nates the intrinsic absurdity of Schopenhauer's morality, which was 
based precisely on these notions. "To expect that strength will not 
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manifest itself as strength, as the desire to overcome, to appropriate, 
to have enemies, obstacles, and triumphs, is every bit as absurd as to 
expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength. 11169 Nietzsche 
blames both the curious inability of the strong to see throuqh the devi-
ous machinations of the weak, and the dualistic interpretation of the 
world reinforced by Kant, for the fact that this disastrous subversion 
of values reigns supreme in contemporary Christian societies. Nietzsche 
explains that once the existence of noumenal reality has been postulated 
and accepted, the concept of "strength" becomes absolutized into a neu-
tral entity-in-itself which has the option either to manifest or to con-
tain itself. As a result of this metaphysical "sleight of hand", it ap-
pears as though it is within the discretion of the strong to act as 
though they were weak--for the "birds of prey" to become the "lambs". 
Nietzsche contends that it is in this manner that the strong are called 
to account for experiencing their natural aggression upon the weak. For 
it is with this appearance of "free choice" in such matters that the 
weak are able to triumph over the stronq--the slaves over the masters. 170 
Furthermore, these slaves, with the ''wily vengefulness of the impo-
tent", successfully transform their inherent weakness into a meritori -
ous deed--into "kindness". And this is what constitutes their "greatest 
trick", whereby those who are unable to avenge themselves are said to be 
- unwilling to do so; therefore, they become not only the "good" but the 
11 j us t" a s we 11 . 
Nietzsche, however, asserts that it is only the powerful who are 
capable of either justice or injustice, and that the rhetoric of tolera-
tion, \'lith which the weak try to obscure the reality of their ethical 
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transvaluation, is intended to veil their own vindictive will to rule--
their natural will to power. Moreover, it is senseless to speak of jus-
tice or injustice, right or wrong per se. For there are no absolute, 
universal standards of good or evil, there are only varyin0 interpreta-
tions and valuations, in which the very same acts (lying, cheating, kill-
ing, exploiting), depending upon the specific situation, may be socially 
condoned or condemned. 171 
But this perversion of values is, to Nietzsche, more than merely a 
case of the weak masquerading as the strong, or the ambiguous nature of 
the concepts of good and evil as they apply to changing conditions. It 
is, rather, an essentially dangerous inversion of the moral realm, in 
which the strong and noble were conquered by deceit and resentment, and 
were fatally transformed into those who saw themselves as the weak had 
labelled them--as the cruel, the evil, and the damned. For the impotent 
have, "with frightening consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic 
value equations good/noble/powerful/beautiful/happy/favored-of-the-gods 
and maintain, with the furious hatred of the underprivileged and impo-
tent, that 'only the poor, the powerless are good; only the suffering, 
sick, and ugly, truly blessed' . 11172 
Christianity, as the heir to this tradition of control based upon 
hatred and indirect manipulation, has actually succeeded in imposing 
artificial limits on man's will; and prevented him from becoming what he 
actually is--the creator, who actively and directly shapes both his 
world and his values. Nietzsche thus reveals that the traditionally 
"good" man really represents "not merely a retrogression but even a dan~-
er, a temptation. a narcotic drug enabling the present to live at the 
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expense of the future. 11173 Although this may appear to be a more com-
fortable and less dangerous course than its alternative, it is, in the 
long run, the greatest danger to man as a species insofar as it prevents 
him from reaching his highest potential. 
Nietzsche believes that only through self-awareness can we even 
hope to see that our natural inclinations to exert our own will to power 
are not 11 bad 11 --that they are, in fact, removed from such mundane consid-
erations as 11 good 11 and "evil 11 • But first, Nietzsche sees that it is 
necessary to free us from these false values: to give us final say over 
our own lives and future. And this essential emancipation from the fet-
ters of traditional 11 degenerate 11 morality can only be accomplished by 
going "beyond good and evil". For, "To reco9nize untruth as a condition 
of life--that certainly means resistin9 the accustomed valued feelings 
in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token 
alone place itself beyond good and evil . 11174 
This is one of Nietzsche's greatest projects: to create new values, 
new standards, and new ''truths" based on what we consciously know to be 
human (not divine or 11 real 11 ) interpretations, rerspectives, and errors--
for these are the only 11 truths 11 we will ever have. To do this, we will 
have to build upon 11 lies 11 and errors, which are inescapable oarts of 
our world. But this is really what we have been doin9 all along, al-
though unknowingly, because when we are faced with new facts or events, 
"We construct a new picture ... with the aid of all the old experiences 
which we have had . 11175 What Nietzsche wants is for us to begin 
doing this consciously, and to realize that just because something is 
traditionally valued does not mean that it is, therefore, "true", but 
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only that it is an old 11 lie 11 , which has forgotten its origins and seeks 
to intimidate us into accepting it at face value. Yet we can no longer 
safely take refuge in these old outworn values, for they are 11 unhealthy 11 
and antagonistic to our future development; and they deny the validity 
of the wi 11 to power as the basis of mora 1 ity. Neither can \'Je seek com-
fort in the 11 truths 11 of our senses, since they also lie: 11 What is new 
finds our senses . hostile and reluctant . All this means: ha-
sically and from time immemorial we are--accustomed to lying one 
is much more of an artist than one knows. 11176 
These pronouncements have an emotionally and intellectually jarring 
impact on us, as does Nietzsche's contention that he is "immoral" in the 
sense that it means "denying that moral judgments are founded on 
truths . . Therefore, I deny morality in the same way as I deny alche-
. I d . t h th 11177 my, 1 .e., eny 1 s ypo eses ... And this is Nietzsche's in-
tenti on, for he hopes to thereby awaken us from our phi 1 osophi ca lly and 
theologically induced stupor, and alert us to the perils of this compla-
cent course. As he warned us, it is dangerous to tunnel into the found-
ations of morality. But some of our knee-jerk aversion to these procla-
mations might be avoided if we remember Nietzsche's admonition that all 
language, concepts, constructs, as well as sensory data, 11 lie 11 in that 
they simplify and thus distort what they seek to communicate. Further-
more, Nietzsche cites an error in reasoning as the basis for the notion 
of 11 antitheses 11 , by which things are categorized as: moral/immoral, 
good/evil, or real/apparent. Nietzsche argues that there are "no oppo-
sites" except in the exaggerations of m~taphysical interpretations. 178 
And this is yet another reason for his dislike of the dualisms propound-
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ed by Kant, Schopenhauer, and the Christian perspectives. Since Nietz-
sche 1 s own assertion, that we desire always to auqment our power, is it-
self neutral with respect to approval or disapproval, he provides us 
with an interpretation that ignores such easy antitheses. 
But more to the point, Nietzsche sees that, 11 The frightful ener~ 
gies--those which are called evil--are the cyclopean architects and 
road-makers of humanity. 11179 He argues that our 11 good 11 qualities (in 
the conventional sense of being 11 humane 11 ) actually have evolved from our 
earlier 11 evil 11 (in the sense of brutish and cruel) qualities because 
th th f h else. lBO Alth h N. t h t ey can no ave come ram anyv1 ere oug le zsc e, oo, 
desires what is good and civilized, he perceives that these goals cannot 
be achieved without the precedinq work of what we would call evil. In 
other words, 11 envy 11 , 11 violence 11 , 1'greed 11 , and 11 hatred 11 all belong to the 
11 favoring 11 circumstances which result in 11 great 11 men and 11 increases in 
virtue 11 • 181 They have, therefore, their own 11 value 11 , as does "bad con-
science 11 • And Nietzsche approves of 11 bad conscience 11 because he per-
ceives it to be nothing more than a 11 temporary illness 11 , similar to 
pregnancy, which is actually 11 full of future". 
Furthermore, it was this "bad conscience 11 that made of man something 
other than a 11 beast 11 --something that could be 11 overcome~ 11 As Nietzsche 
proclaims in Thus Spoke Zarasthustra (1883): 11 Man is something that 
shall be overcome. 11182 But this was not originally possible, for it was 
only when man suffered from such evils--from himself as the architect of 
these evils--that he became a 11 promise 11 to be somethinq more, and al-
tered the earth itself in order to fulfill his own needs. And this is 
yet another reason why we must go beyond the simple antitheses of good 
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and evil, real and apparent, or true and false, and develop our own 
scale of values--but consciously this time, and with concern for the 
very human consequences involved. Moreover, v-ie must take care to see 
that our 11 bad 11 passions are cultivated into 11_good 11 ones, instead of be-
ing rooted out, as all previous moralities have sought to do. 183 
Or, to use Nietzsche's term, these evil drives must be 11 sublimated". 
This means that they must be transformed into somethinq else. Since we 
possess the same basic drives as do the beasts, the only way that these 
can be converted into something distinctively human is by such sublima-
tion of our own will to power. 184 And the personification of such a 
subli1:1ation is Nietzsche's 11 superman 11 • Essentially, this concept of the 
superman represents Nietzsche's greatest project of all, because it 
sf10vJs the means by wllich we, as individuals, can actively transform O?lr-
selves, and therefore our world, into something that is better. That is, 
into something that is both beyond our present simplistic interpretation 
of our passions and drives as "good/evil"; and beyond humanity itself as 
it nov1 exists. In fact, Nietzsche reminds us that "~!hat is qreatest in 
man is that he is a bridge and not a goal. 11185 
Although this notion is in direction opposition to Kant's contention 
that man is, and should ah1ays be treated as, an "end" and not as a 
11 means 11 , to Nietzsche, this is precisely man's value. It is not that 
the fundamental nature of will to power has been chan?ed, but that its 
objects have been. For Nietzsche's superman is one who has successful-
ly organized the chaos of his own passions and become creative: he has 
not succumbed to despair and nihilism in the face of life's terrors, but 
instead has become master over his own fears and affirmed life without 
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resentment. He has thereby channeled his destructive will to power; 
which sweeps away all previous moral distinctions!into the positive con-
struction and creation of new values and new interpretations. The super-
man thus illustrates the acme of will to power, which is embodied in his 
own self-control, and faces life without fear of himself, others, or his 
own mortality. And this is Nietzsche's most important achievement, for 
it enables him to transcend the 11 modern nihilism 11 which he sees as ulti-
mately destructive of all values, and of all life. As Nietzsche pro-
claims: 11 Not 'humanity', but superman is the goal ! 11186 
One of the consequences of this notion is Nietzsche's adamant asser-
tion that some of our interpretations--our 11myths 11 --are better than oth-
ers, (just as a strong will is better than a weak one), for they facili-
t t l f . 187 a e our own se -overcoming. This also helps to explain Nietzsche's 
impassioned intolerance of those who prove themselves to be so impotent 
that they are unable to use their will to create. But Nietzsche's imna-
tience on this issue is equally indebted to his deep-seated animosity to 
the Kantian and Christian claims that this apparent world is not the 
11 rea 111 one. Fundamentally, these two concepts are intertwined, for they 
both betray a fatal failure of nerve: "The belief which holds that the 
world, which ought to b.e, ~real, is a belief of the unproductive, of 
those \<Jho will not create a world as it ought to be. They imagine that 
it is there, and they seek ways and means to attain it. 11188 And in so 
doing, they divert their attention, energy, and will from those problems 
which they actually could overcome, and prevent themselves from ever be-
coming 11 superman. 11 
The intrinsic dissimilarity between Nietzsche's views and those of 
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Kant and Schopenhauer is hereby revealed. Neither Kant nor Schopenhauer 
permit us to have final control--and thus power over--the creation of 
our world or ourselves, and this is Nietzsche's ultimate aim. Nietzsche, 
writing at the end of the 19th century, is able.to look back over the 
previous developments in politics, philosophy, and psychology, and see 
that these have been insufficient in providing us with the means to at-
tain our individual potential. What is needed is a new interpretation 
which will enable us to wrest control from the steadily increasing power 
of the state, which Nietzsche sees as epitomized by Bisriarck 1 s "bombas-
tic nationalism", and that of society, which Nietzsche perceives as emas-
culating us by encouraging our submission to the 11 herd ideals" of weak-
ness. Nietzsche fears that if we do not become conscious of our person-
al will to power--of our individual ability to alter our world and there-
by make a substantial difference--that we wi 11 succumb to the ni hi l i s.n 
which is robbing us of our will to create. And he believes that this 
nihilism is the greatest danger of all, and is, furthermore, a part of 
the legacy left by the philosophical investigations of Kant and Schopen-
hauer. For Kant's limitation of reason shows that we can never know any 
"real" world, although we believe that it exists; and Schopenhauer's il-
lumination of the irrational will, operating in a purposeless universe, 
as the basis of this "reality" demonstrates that \'Je are ultimately impo-
tent. It appears that Nietzsche 1 s description of a nihilist can thus be 
interpreted as a resounding condemnation of both Schopenhauer and Kant, 
for~ 11 A nihilist is one who judges of the world as it is that it ought 
not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist. 11189 
Conclusion 
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In reviewing the development of the concept of will, from its earli-
est appearance as appetites or desires, to its modern transformation in-
to the will to power, one curious fact emerges which has not yet been 
addressed. Why have the greatest proponents of the will--from Kant, who 
first liberates the will to use it as the foundation of all morality, to 
Nietzsche, who celebrates it as the means by which we may alter our pre-
sent, and thereby our future--al 1 been German philosophers?· It has 
been suggested that this focus on the will--on human control over certain 
attitudes or events--may have resulted from the chaotic sufferin0 pro-
duced by the Thirty Years I vJar (1618-1648) in the Germani es. 190 This 
was an anarchic experience v1hich the rest of Europe, at least in terms 
of the extent and duration of constant hostilities, was able to avoid. 
But this breakdovm of political, social and moral or<ler and securit.v 
left a lasting imprint on the Germanies. And whi1e a modicum of intern-
al controi vJas achieved under the Confede"~ation of German states in the 
th 
early 19 century, the actual state of affairs was one which was charac-
terized by inefficiency and inertia. Thuss it has been hyoothesized 
that the German fascination with vJill per se, and specifically v!ith a 
"strong will ,n may have grown out of a deep-seated historical desire for 
actually accomplishing something, for followina throur:ih on an intended 
ideal. In this analysis, the "Prussian efficiency" embodied by Bismarck 
in his war against Austria (1866), and his eventual unification of the 
German states under the Empire (1871), illustrate the practical appeal 
of such a focus on will. But this sug~estion, althouah intriguin9, does 
not seem to do justice to the diverse insights and aims of Kant, Schopen-
hauer, or Nietzsche. 
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Kant, who admits that a "free \'Ii 11 could be a monstrous thing 11191 
if it were not autonomous, i.e., subject to its own moral laws, never-
theless maintains that this "still remains c. useful and proper idea for 
the purposes of a rational faith. 11192 For it is to the task of devisinq 
an adequate and accurate guide to the ethical decision-making precess 
that Kant sets iris ovm "pure practical reason"--his ovm viill. Even 
Nietzsche would agree that Kant is successful in this endeavor, at least 
to the extent that Kant systematically illuminates the boundaries beyond 
which reason fails to be an "adequate guide" to one's moral actions. 
But it is within the osychological realm, with its irrational, insinc-
tual components, that Kant's attempt ultimately founders. 
Schopenhaeur perceives that there is a fundamental flaw in Kant's 
theory, and therefore examin~s what Kant had avoided--the emotional, ir-
ra tiona 1 nature of r.ian and his uni verse. _Schopenhauer thus rm sits his 
ovm version of the 11 noumenal \-Jill", v1hich is instinctual, irrationa1, and 
purposeless, as the basis for his new system. Yet Schopenhauer's view 
has its own "flaws", central to v1hich is his admission that the only es-
cape from the meaningless misery of his vision lies through the intellec-
tual suppression of the all-pov1erful v1il 1. But Schopenhauer never ex-
plains hov1 our intellect, which he often describes as a sighted lame man 
who is carried by a blind man (the will), 193 can ever attain supre~acy, 
no matter how fleeting, over the incessant striving of the will. For 
how can an intellect affirm or deny the will, when the will itself seems 
to 1 i e in the noumenal realm, outside of the phenomena 1 \'lorl d of this 
intellect? By what mechanism can this ·intellect, raised as the "servant" 
of the will, attain its independence and actually become "will-less"? 
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It would appear to require some sort of transcendental quality to accomp-
1 . h th h . b . 194 is e ero1c feat, ut Schopenhauer has not granted it any. 
Even Kant's theories, "bloodlessly rational" though they rnay be, 
are more helpful to Nietzsche's project of hu~an liberation than Schopen-
hauer's. For Kant calls not only for freedom from external constraints, 
but for the fulfillment of ourselves through the freedom of our own 
self-determination. This is the meaninq of Kant's insistence upon the 
autonomy of our mora 1 vJi 11 , whereby the mora 1 1 if e (one that is 1 i ved 
under the self-imposed law of the categorical imperative) is eauivalent 
to freedom--and this is a radical sense of "self-determination". Yet 
Nietzsche, who would approve of the concept of self-determination, would 
go further and inquire, as Zarasthustra did, "Free for what?" And Nietz-
sche would then inquire: "Can you 9ive yourself your own evil and your 
own good and hang your ow~ will over yourself as a law? Can you be 
195 your own judge and avenger of your law?" If so, you could enter iilto 
the ranks of the potential supermen--the creators of a more hu~ane 
~·mrld. 
But Kant could not, for it would be blasphemy for one who had tried 
to "make room for faith~', to do so. And Schopenhauer vmuld not, for he 
believes that, for men to live is merely to be what they already are, 
and there is no chance of heroic self-transcendence possible in this 
view. Yet Nietzsche, also, would have trouble followina the path sug-
gested by Zarasthustra. For he sees too clearly the dangers involved, 
1Q6 1 and asks instead: "today--is greatness possible?" - If it is possib e, 
Nietzsche believes that: "He shall be greatest who can be loneliest, 
the most concealed, the most deviant, the human being beyond good and 
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evil, the master of his virtues, he that is overrich in will . 11197 But 
Nietzsche already fears that some of his own thoughts are on the ver~e 
of becoming accepted: 11 You have already taken off your novelty, and some 
of you are ready, I fear, to become truths: they already look so im-
mortal, so pathetically decent, so dull! 11198 And once they become 
11 truths 11 , they will become as fixed, and canonical, and stale, and bind-
ing as those which preceded them. Yet even this perception does not 
daunt Nietzsche for long, or convince him of the impossibility of trans-
forming ourselves and our world, for he believes that even this 111 Truth 1 
is the vlill to be master over the multiplicity of sensations ... 11199 
fiO 
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graduate courses in Western History and Civilization #111 and 
#112. ·Responsible for evaluat~ng and ~radinq all quizzes, papers, 
and exams in these courses. 
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Dates: 
Title: 
Em pl ayer: 
Duties: 
Dates: 
Title: 
Empl ayer: 
Duties: 
Dates: 
Title: 
Employer: 
Duties: 
Dates: 
Title: 
Employer: 
Duties: 
Dates: 
Title: 
Employer: 
Duties: 
Dates: 
Title: 
Em pl ayer: 
Duties: 
Dates: 
Title: 
Employer: 
Du ti es: 
9/1983-8/ l 984 
Fellowshfp Recipient 
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 
Completed necessary courses required for Ph.D. candidates. 
9/1982-6/1983 
Graduate Assistant in History 
History Department, University of Richmond, Virginia. 
Supported research duties of assigned faculty members; delivered 
lectures on requested topics for undergraduate history courses; 
and led discussions on required class readings in undergraduate 
history classes. 
9/1979-6/1982 
Learning/Behavior Disabilities Tutor, Secondary Level 
Upper Arlington City Schools, Ohio. 
Developed Individual Educational Plans (I.E.P.'s), and provided 
individualized instruction in all academic subjects for students 
with learning/behavior disorders at the senior high level. 
1/1979-6/1979 
Mathematics Teacher, Secondary Level 
Richmond City Schools, Virginia. 
Taught Algebra I, Geometry, Remedial Math 12, and General Math 9 
to high school students in a regular classroom setting. 
9/1974-11/1978 
Learning/Behavior Disabilities Tutor, Secondary Level 
Zanesville City Schools, Ohio. 
Developed Individual Educational Plans (I.E.P. 's) and provided 
individualized instruction in all academic subjects for students 
at the junior high level with learning/behavior disorders. Com-
piled case studies; administered academic and modality assessments~ 
and implemented all requisite remediation in specific deficit 
areas for these designated students. 
1973-1977 
Research Assistant 
Dr. Joseph Dubbert, New Concord, Ohio. 
Researched materials for inclusion in Dr. Dubbert's book, A Man's 
Place, published by Prentice Hall-Spectrum Series, 1978. 
9/1973-6/1974 
Assistant to History Department 
Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio. 
Provided necessary support to assigned faculty members in the 
History Department. 
2 
Dates: 
Title: 
Employer: 
Duties: 
5/1967-9/1967 
Astrophysics Laboratory Assistant 
Aero-Space Research Laboratories, Wright Patterson A.F.B., Ohio. 
Made tracings from oscillograph recordings on light intensity re-
flected from early satellites--Echo I and II, etc. This work was 
later incorporated into a book published by Aero-Space Research 
Laboratories, 1968. 
Awards and Honors 
1966: Recipient of National Federation of Women's Clubs Award for Out-
standing High School Senior. Dayton, Ohio. 
1966: Received full scholarship to Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio. 
1974: Graduated Magnacum Laude in the Honors Program at Muskingum College, 
with Distinction in the Department of Philosophy and Religion, and 
in the Department of History. 
1982: Awarded Graduate Assistantship in the Department of History, Uni• 
versity of Richmond, Virginia. 
1983: Recipient of Albright JI.ward for Outstanding Graduate Student in 
the Humanities. University of Richmond, Virginia. 
1983-1984: Awarded University Fellowship for Ph.D. program in the History 
Department, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 
1984-1985: Awarded Teaching Assistantship in History, Ohio State University, 
Columbus, Ohio. 
Honorary Affiliations 
1965: National Honor Society 
1967: Phi Sigma Tau, National Philosophy Honorary. 
1972: Phi Alpha Theta, National History Honorary. 
Presentations 
1968: Student Invitational Speaker at funeral services held in honor of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio. 
3 
1978: Creativity and the Exceptional Child, by Jane E. Edwards. Paper 
presented to Meeting of the Upper Arlington City Tutors of Learn-
ing/Behavior Disabled students. 
1984: Hitler: From 11 Superman 11 to 11 Underdog 11 • A Study of the Intention-
al i st/Functionalist Controversy in Contemporary Historiography. 
Paper presented at the Phi Alpha Theta Annual Conference, held at 
the University of Toledo, Ohio. 
Publications 
Service 
Edwards, Jane E. A Genealogy of the Will: A Comparison of the 
Works of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. University Microfilms 
International, 1986. 
1972-1974: President and vice-president of Phi Sigma Tau, National Philosophy 
Honorary, Delta Chapter, Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio. 
9/1984-8/1985: Representative for Graduate Student Affairs Council, (G.S.A.C.) 
for the History Department, Ohio State University, Columbus, 
Ohio. 
1/1985-6/1985: Member of Graduate Student Recommendation Committee, for His-
tory Departmental Chairman Search Committee, Ohio State Uni-
versity, Columbus, Ohio. 
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